Coping with Social Polarization in the Urban Landscape - Reflections upon the Politics of Empowerment

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COPING WITH SOCIAL POLARIZATION IN THE URBAN LANDSCAPE - REFLECTIONS UPON THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT

BY
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JØRGEN ELM LARSEN

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John Andersen and Jørgen Elm Larsen:
Coping with social polarization in the urban landscape - reflections upon the politics of empowerment

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Preface

This Research Report consists of four pre-prints of papers which are related to GEP's research stream on Citizenship, Exclusion and Community Empowerment.

The first paper by John Andersen *"Urban Policy between neoelitist growth policy and community empowerment"* was presented at the GEP International Conference, Vilvorde, Denmark, August 2000, at the annual meeting of the Danish Sociological Association, August 2000 and at the workshop in the URSPIC-network, Belgium, November 2001.

The second paper by Jørgen Elm Larsen *"Spatialization and Culturalization of Social Policy: Conducting Marginal People in Local Communities"* was presented at the Coference *Area-based initiatives in contemporary urban policy*, Danish Building and Urban Research and European Urban Research Association, Copenhagen 17-19 May 2001

The third paper by Jørgen Elm Larsen *"Who cares about and for marginal people?"* was presented at the 5th Conference of the European Sociological Association: Visions and divisions. Challenges to European sociology. August 28 – September 1, 2001, Helsinki, Finland.

The fourth paper by Jørgen Elm Larsen *"The active society and activation policy"* was presented at the Conference of the Graduate School for Integration, Production and Welfare: Aktiveringsindsatsen i Danmark. Social aktivering og arbejdsmarkedsaktivering, 28-31 October 2001, Sandbjerg Gods, Denmark and at the Cost A13 Conference: Social Policy, Marginalisation and Citizenship, 2-4 November 2001, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark.

John Andersen and Jørgen Elm Larsen

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Urban Policy between neoelitist growth policy and community empowerment.

BY

John Andersen

Summary

This paper is based on my work in the GEP-project and the U.R.S.P.I.C. Urban Redevelopment and Social Polarisation in the City project . (Moulart, Swyngedouw and Rodriguez (1999) TSER- project funded by the EU 4.th framework programme.

The final report can be found at www.ifresi.univ-lille1.fr select "programmes des recherché", select "URSPIC".

The purpose of the URSPIC project is the analysis of the mechanisms of social polarisation in urban Europe. The investigation of thirteen big projects of urban development must enable to study the different forms of social exclusion /integration, to determine its causes, to examine the impact of social, economic and spatial policies and to suggest innovations in the field of urban policy.

The programme was co-ordinated by Frank Moulaert, IFRESI-CNRS, UFR de Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Université de Lille, France, Arantxa Rodriguez, Department of Applied Economics, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao, Spain and Erik Swyngedouw, School of Geography, University of Oxford and St. Peter's College, Oxford, UK.

The thirteen projects came from the following cities: Athens, Berlin, Bilbao, Birmingham, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Lille, Lisbon, London, Naples, Rotterdam, Vienna.

The results from the URSPIC project have so far been published in Special issue of *Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia* 'Metropoli in Trasformazione': Vol. 41, 4 (4/2000). Edited by Serena Vicari, Erik Swyngedouw and Arantxa Rodriguez. Introduction, cases studies on Berlin, Copenhagen, Naples.

Special issue of *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 'Social Polarization in Metrpolitan areas: the role of new urban policy'. Vol. 8, 2 (April 2001). Edited by Frank Moulaert, Erik Swyngedouw and Arantxa Rodriguez. Theoretical introduction, case studies on Naples, Brussels, Vienna, Lille and Bilbao.

Special issue of *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 'Economic restructuring and political governance in European cities'. Editors as above. Theoretical article on urban restructuring and governance. Case studies on Berlin, Birmingham, London, Copenhagen and Rotterdam. To be published in 2001 (in print).

(Frank Moulaert, Erik Swyngedouw and Arantxa Rodriguez eds.) Urbanising Globalisation. Urban Redevelopment and Social Polarisation in the European City. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

The Danish Urban Development Programme (UDP) the Orestadsproject embodies larger

transitions of Urban planning and governance in Copenhagen. Up till the seventies urban policy was characterised by top-down rational planning. The post-war "golden age" of the " Welfare City" rested on a strong centralised City Hall administration in the hands of a powerful Social Democratic leadership since the beginning of the 19th Century. During the seventies the efficiency and legitimacy of the regime was challenged by i) a weakened urban economy due to industrial decline and demographic changes, which eroded the tax-base and ii) powerful leftist forces and successful mobilisation from new urban movements. The latter challenged the top-down style of planning and style of governance and mobilised for community based participatory urban regeneration. In the beginning of the eighties a situation of political and institutional dislocation of the regime fused with a financial crisis of the City. This in turn increased the conflicts over additional grants with the state level (from 1982- 92 in the hands of a Liberal- Conservative coalition) in the mid and late eighties. From the late eighties an onwards state initiated pressure for a Metropolitan strategic growth policy became manifest and a gradual shift towards a "Entrepreneurial City" strategy linked to the emerging cross-border regional strategy became the new orientation of urban policy during the nineties. The Danish UDP was the result the formation of a strategic growth partnership between the state and the Capital. In this strategy the Orestadsproject is the flagship-project of the Oresunds region

At the start of the millennium the urban policy orientation and governance can be characterised by a **duality** between

1. *Participatory, empowering* welfare oriented strategies, which targets deprived districts and neighbourhoods, which are based on notions of the diverse and solidaristic City and

2. *Neoelitist/corporative growth strategies*, which are based on notions of the Entrepreneurial City.

The tension and possible mediation between the two orientations represents one of the challenges for urban governance concerned with problems of overcoming social polarisation in the urban space.

Urban Policy between neoelitist growth policy and community empowerment in Copenhagen

1. Introduction.

The paper summarises the objectives of the danish Urban Development Programme (UDP) the Oerestad project in Copenhagen, its institutional form and the conflicts in the phases of design and implementation which arose around the neo-elitist type of governance embodied in the UDP. The urban governance changes are interpreted in a broader historical context with emphasis on how the transition towards a new post-industrial economy and urban form was mediated via political and institutional struggles over the form and content of urban planning in Copenhagen. The UDP is analysed as an outcome of a transformed Copenhagen urban regime and a changed powermatrix, which from the late eighties opened for a new state led and growth focussed entrepreneurial urban and Metropolitan regional policy. Finally the challenges and dilemmas for overcoming the dualism of present urban governance between neo-corporate growth regimes and participatory and welfare oriented policy paradigms is elaborated upon.

2. The political and economic background in the seventies and eighties for the shift to City Entrepreneurialism in the nineties.

The political and economical context in which the Danish UDP and the New Urban Policy of the nineties was born can briefly be summarised as follows:

In the 1970's the Social Democratic hegemonic urban regime, which had dominated the City Hall since the beginning of the century, were heavily challenged by the growing strength the new urban movements and the New Left (Socialist Left Party and the Socialist Peoples Party) who held 30-40% of the seats in the City Council Alliances between radical working class segments, the new urban movements, and new- and old left political radicals created a unique "post-68" political climate in the city throughout the seventies. The new left forces heavily criticised the Social Democrats for a "top-down" authoritarian urban renewal policy, which was based upon the interest of the (imagined) "standard working- and middle class" family, and, according to the new left, did not take "particularism", the social and cultural diversity of the urban space into account. The orientation of the urban movements could be interpreted as a combination of criticism of rational planning paradigms in its rigid bureaucratic forms. In short their nodal point was a welfare City in which civil society and notions of direct democracy held a stronger position vis a vis the monolistic City Hall administration.

The tensions between the City Hall and the new urban movements became manifest around 1980. For the grassroot movements and the political left the Social Democratic regime and its homogenous urban renewal programmes based on functionalistic rational planning paradigms was personified in the Lord Mayor Egon Weidekamp as a " Social Democratic Machine Politician". The pinnacle of this dislocation was a week long fight between locals and the police that took place in the streets of Noerrebro in 1980. The event was provoked by the City Hall decision to remove a popular playground ("Byggeren") in the area. In reality the conflict was also about the authoritarian non- participatory style in the implementation of urban renewal schemes. After this episode the political climate deteriorated even more, and on the national political scene the Municipality of Copenhagen got the label of being partly "ungovernable". The department for urban planning had been controlled the popular Villo Sigurdson from Left-socialist Party. Since the mid eighties the authority of this important department was removed to the direct control of the Lord Mayor. The left claimed that this removal was illegal and a year long conflict took place in the courts in the mid eighties about the administrative responsibility for urban planning. This unstable situation paralysed the Copenhagen urban planning system.

The political polarisation and institutional dislocation fused with financial problems:growing budget deficits due to a shrinking tax-base caused by demographic change and industrial decline .Copenhagen was hit much harder than the rest of Denmark by the unemployment crisis from the mid-seventies and onwards. In Copenhagen the general crisis fused with a long-term trend since the sixties with massive loss of manual industrial jobs. The level of public investments in Copenhagen also shrinked compared to the rest of Denmark. This was in part due to a national decentralisation policy, which was the dominating paradigm until the late eighties. Furthermore, the municipalities **outside** Copenhagen have benefited most by the growth in high-paid service sector jobs, which indeed occurred in the last decades,due to a growing number of commuters.

Due to the strength of the left-wing parties and the strong Social Democratic position the financial problems was not managed by dramatic cuts in welfare services but largely by accumulation of depts ("defensive Municipal keynesianism") and low levels of public investments. Today the municipal dept is approximately 1.6. billion – and still burdens the Municipal budget.

The policy responses during the eighties of the Copenhagen Socialdemocratic leadership consisted of three components

1. Political pressure for additional state grants until the mid eighties.
2. A gradual changed housing policy favouring middle- and highincome households.
3. Attempts to develop a coherent regional strategy for employment and infrastructure development within the framework of the regional authority The Greater Copenhagen Council (founded in 1974)

3. Confrontation with the state about additional grants

In the beginning and mid eighties the dominating strategy of the City hall was ongoing attempts to negotiate with the state about the allocation of additional financial resources to Copenhagen, based on political acknowledgement of over average social needs and the inadequacy of the system for national redistribution among Municipalities. The Social Democratic national government, which was in office until 1982 had recognised the need for serious negotiations. When the Conservative-Liberal government came into office in 1982 after decades of Social Democratic rule an expert commission appointed by the liberal home secretary was created. The commission pointed towards two negative self-perpetuating mechanisms of the socio-economic crisis: 1) industrial decline, lack of new growth and employment sectors and 2) an expensive demographic composition of the population (many elderly and young) including increasing concentration of social excluded and other low income groups (Andersen et. al, 1984). Despite the political pressure the system of Municipal reimbursement and state grants remained almost unchanged. The result was foreseeable increasing Municipal depts.

4. The gradual changed housing policy favouring middle and high income groups

Since the City Hall was run by the Social Democratic party from the beginning of the century Social Housing and Municipal owned Housing was from the beginning of the century an important part of Social Democratic Housing Policy. Social Housing in Denmark dates back to the beginning of the century where the first Social Democratic controlled Municipalities supported Housing Cooperatives, which became closely linked to the labour movement (Kolstrup, 1996). The democratic tradition of self governance in the housing cooperatives is regarded as a unique "social capital", which in fact constitutes one of the overlooked strengths of the Danish universalistic oriented welfare regime (Munk, 98). In the eighties the amounts of new build Social Housing estates decreased and since the late nineties it has stopped. Furthermore, the Municipal owned Houses was sold in mid nineties. This strategic change in housing policy as a way of improving the tax base was gradually accepted by the Social Democratic leadership in a path-breaking alliance with the strengthened Liberal and Conservative members of the City Council. Hence the Social Housing Associations, which by tradition held a strong position in the Social Democratic policy network, have been placed in a much more peripheral position. The political changes fused with market changes: the combination of inflation and regulation of tax reduction for private ownership from the sixties and onwards made the purchase of property very advantageous for upper working class and middle class households. The combined result of these changes was that the social geography in the Metropolitan region became more polarised (Thor Andersen, 1999) because middle-income residents left the Social Housing sector in

which the share of low-income residents increased. After the battle for full employment was lost in the late seventies the growing segment of long-term labour market exclusion was gradually concentrated in distinct urban districts (Toernquist, 1998) A fact which was recognised at the national level when the National Urban Committee was launched in 1993/1994. (refer to later section.)

Hence some Copenhagen districts have gradually been gentrificated like the Inner City and Christianshavn. In the gentrified districts private ownership and private Co-operative Housing has increased and is now dominating. Other districts with a great share of Social Housing estates like Bispebjerg and Kongens Enghave have moved from the middle to the bottom of the urban hierarchy. Thirty years ago these districts with a big share of Social Housing built in the twenties, thirties and forties was the prototype of well organised working class quarters. Thirty-forty years ago Noerrebro and Vesterbro, with an older housing stock from the late 18th century and a big share of private rental blocks, was dominated by the "lower" working class people. Today these former classical working class districts has moved toward a more mixed ethnic, social and income profile - due to huge urban renewal schemes in the eighties and nineties and a growth in private ownership (Munk, 1998).

5. The missing regional strategy for employment and infrastructure development

With regard to infrastructure and growth stimulating initiatives the regional political authority: the Greater Copenhagen Council (GCC) had the task of insuring this. The GCC, which was established in 1974, was from the beginning in a functional and financial crises in part due to its diffuse legal status. The GCC was paralysed by struggles between the poor Social Democratic and Leftist governed Copenhagen and the richer Conservative-Liberal Municipalities outside Copenhagen. It was finally closed down by the Conservative-Liberal government in 1987 (parallel to the abolishment of the Greater London Council in the United Kingdom by the Thatcher government) and the Metropolitan region was left without a political authority. The closure of the GCC only extended the problems of governing Copenhagen and the region. The need for traffic investments in the Copenhagen area has been recognised for a long time, but was blocked due to financial and institutional-political struggles between the state, the Municipality of Copenhagen and the Greater Copenhagen Council (GCC).
In this situation of a long lasting Municipal budget deficits and the political administrative dislocation at the regional level the conservative-liberal government in the late eighties held a strong bargaining position vis a vis the Municipality of Copenhagen. As will be shown its was in this economic, institutionel and political context the danish UDPs was born.

6. Towards the Entrepreneurial City - the UDP as catalysist of a stateled growth oriented urban governance

After the years of the "ungovernability" of Copenhagen in the eighties and a situation of serious socio-economic decline the new urban regime of social democratic and "state led city entrepreneurialism" (Harvey, 1989) emerged in the late 1980's. The new Social Democratic leadership gave up the former confrontation policy vis a vis the state and was less committed to defend the classical values of the welfare City – in particular the commitment to take the interests of low-income groups in housing policy into account. In the field of urban renewal a more open and pluralistic **style** of governance emerged, and a more participatory orientation in the urban renewal programmes- based on ideas of communicative and incremental planning (Sehested, 1999) occurred in the nineties. The large scale urban renewal programme on Vesterbro is the flagship of this trend in which ecological experimentation is integrated in the ongoing programmes.

The most path breaking change from the late eighties an onwards, was however the linkage of the urban regeneration strategy to a Metropotolitan regional growth strategy. Since the beginning of the 1990's, when also the national social democratic leadership was replaced by a more centre-oriented one, and when the Social Democratic Party came back in power in 1992 at the national level (after a decade of Liberal- Conservative rule) the State-Municipal growth alliance has been relative stable. As will be shown the UDP, the Oerestad project, became the flagship project in the implementation of the new strategy. It should however be emphasised that the "schumpetarian/entrepreneurial" orientation still was linked to basic Social Democratic values including the maintenance of a strong public sector in the field of social services and inclusion of trade union leadership in the policy networks, the trade unions who also co-ordinated the Metropolitan strategy for economic regeneration. Hence the Danish urban schumpetarianism from the beginning had its Social Democratic or "negotiated economy" blueprints, unlike e.g. the UK where schumpetarianism was linked to an aggressive neoliberal strategy.

As a comprehensive answer to the problems facing Copenhagen in two decades, high unemployment, industrial decline and lack of infrastructure investments (Maskell 86, 91) the new growth oriented attitude towards urban and regional development was manifest in the late 80's (Gaardmand 91, 96, Andersen, 98). The major change was the emphasis on urban development as a strategic mean to compete against other European city regions for investments in the transitions towards the service based post-industrial economy and urban form (Matthiessen, 93). Copenhagen was now to act as a dynamo for regional and national growth. This was a shift away from the former dominant orientation in Danish regional policy which had emphasised on **interregional equalisation** and hence disfavoured the Capital in the ongoing struggles over public infrastructure and other investments. In par-

ticular the cross border **Oresund region**, made up by five administrative units on Zealand (Frederiksborg, Roskilde and Copenhagen county and the Municipalities of Copenhagen and Frederiksberg) and the southern part of Sweden, Skaane, re-entered the discourse as a potential dynamo of growth with Copenhagen as its pivotal point. As the Oresundsbridge between Denmark and Sweden had been decided by the parliament in 1991, the transportation time from Copenhagen to Malmoe would be shortened . The Oeresundsbridge had been discussed since the powerful EU- lobby the " Round Table of European Industrialists" suggested the bridge in 1983 (Lemberg, 1999). From 1989 and onwards the comprehensive visioning of Copenhagen as the centre of a competitive region emerged in official City Master Plans reports and recommendations from a Metropolitan expert commission ("What do we want to do with the capital?", 89), backed up by influential parts of the academic community (Andersson & Matthiessen 93). In this entrepreneurial growth discourse and policy orientation both the Oresundsbridge and later the Orestad project were symbols of the future competitive, creative knowledge based region.

In 1990 a Metropolitan committee on traffic investments, the "Würtzen Committee", suggested the establishment of a Copenhagen Metro system and the development of the Orestads-area as a new Copenhagen district. The special feature of the Danish UDP in terms of its organisational and financial construction was the combination of two different projects: i) the construction of the new Orestad City district and ii) a huge expansion of the traffical infrastructure, which would connect Amager with Frederiksberg through a metro system with its nexus in the central parts of Copenhagen. (Gaardmand 1991). The Metro investment was linked to supplementing investments in highways linking central Copenhagen with the Greater Copenhagen area, and railways connecting the Orestad and Amager with the existing railway system and the Swedish railways

The land to be used had been earmarked for a large scale urban development project since 1963 and was owned jointly by the state (45 %) and the municipality (55%). The idea of creating a new City district dated back to 1963. The first plans was first and foremost driven by the need for Social housing in the Copenhagen area. The plan was met with scepticism due to the present dominating national orientation in regional planning, which emphasised expansion outside the Capital and after the sharp economic decline and oil-crisis in 1973, the plan disappeared from the Masterplan of Copenhagen. The old idea was now reintroduced with a new content in a new economic and political context as its was linked to the emerging regional and City entrepreneurial strategy (Wichmann Matthiessen, 1993)

The clue in the plan was to suggest incremental planning within a masterplan, where the proceeds from the selling of land would be used to finance the metro, and when it was finished (around 2003) the proceeds from the Metro would be channelled back to cover outstanding liabilities from the development. In this way the concept of urban rent was re-

invented and introduced into urban politics. This was a stretch of the mandate given to the committee (Andersen, 1998) since the overall purpose of the committee was to plan future traffic investments in the Capital, not to make plans for new large scale urban development projects. However, since traffic, in the sense of the suggested Copenhagen Metro system' was part of the package the Committee argued that the mandate was not overstepped. Hence because of the pragmatic perspective of the initial planning actors the project solved pressing problems for a range of different sectors and at different levels of scale. In this sense the design process of the Danish UDP has resemblences with the well known garbage can model. From other theoretical angles e.g. growth machine theory (Harding, 1994) or neomarxist regulation theoretical approaches (Jessop, 1998) or regime theory (Stones 1989, 1993) the design process could be seen as step in the formation of a neo-coorporatist growth regime. Following Stone a regime can be defined as "relative stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions" (Stone, 1989, p.4) The "iron law" of regimes is that they must be able to mobilise resources suitable for the political agenda at a given time and place (Stones, 1993, p.21).
One important tactical strength of the project design was its **geo-political rationality.** The proposed project was designed to be capable of overcoming the strong scepticism of the national politicians who represented the interests of the province also known as the "Jytland lobby" (Andersen, 98). So far the presence of the informal, but powerful lobby "Jytland lobby", which included politicians in both the opposition and the government, had blocked effectively for larger Copenhagen infrastructure investments. With the proposed financing scheme the Copenhagen infrastructure and regional growth package could be presented as virtually neutral to the state budget.

For the Liberal-Conservative government the institutional form of the ODC furthermore had a **strategic political rationality.** The use of hybrid organisations Quango's, partnerships e.t.c. in urban development as well as in other areas of policy (Sehested, 1999) was in line with the governments general new public management orientation and attempts to introduce more "business-like modus operandi" in public planning. *The success of the Metropolitan growth and regeneration regime in the initial phase was the linkage of a (i) geo-political rationality, which meant a breakthrough for the Capital which had been kept in an "ironfist" for decades and a (ii) national political- ideological rationality related to introduction of quasi market governance instruments.*

Being aware of the controversial political character of the project and its underlying strategy, the Metropolitan expert Committee chose to keep the project on a need to know basis until the proposal had been completed and the key actors at the political level had committed themselves to the project (Andersen, 1998). In the UDP design phase in the beginning of the nineties the Conservative Party was in government with the Liberal party, while the Social Democratic Party was the largest party in the parliament and the dominant party in

the Copenhagen City Council. At the political level the key actors in the new path breaking State-Capital growth coalition was the leaderships of the social democratic and the conservative party (in particular the Lord Mayor of Copenhagen, Jens Kramer and the present Minister of Finance, Henning Dyremose).

When the plans leaked to the public before the proposal was published it caused heavy criticism from professionals and in the public for its democratic shortcuts and unrealistic financial calculations. Existing statutory planning guidelines had been completely overruled - a fact which all (six) professors of Urban Planning in Denmark emphasised in their remarkably sharp criticism against the proposal (Larsen/Paludan, 2000). Influential professionals in urban planning and critics within the public discourse criticised the plan using terms such as " Elitist Corporate Planning" and "Politics of Illusionism" (Lemberg, 1999).

The Social Democratic-Conservative and State-Municipal/Capital "City Entrepreneurial Coalition", rejected the criticism. The exception from this was the response to the criticism from the powerful Nature Preservation Foundation, who held a strong position in the public discourse on environmental issues, and after negotiations a larger part of the land than anticipated in the initial project was preserved as a nature reservation area.

Despite the intense criticism the coalition was powerful enough to speed up the process of implementation. In 1992 a law on the institutional set-up and general terms for the project passed through the parliament, where only the United Left, The Socialist Peoples Party and Progress voted against the law. In the law it was stated that the Orestads Development Cooperation (ODC) was to be formed to manage the development and selling of land and the construction of the Metro. The ODC, whose institutional form was a shareholder company, was owned by the state and the municiapality of Copenhagen. The board of the ODC consists of 6 members. The present chairman is the former Liberal Minister of Finance and later EU-commissioner Henning Christoffersen, the Social Democratic Lord mayor of Copenhagen Mayor, who links the project directly to City Hall, two members of the Copenhagen City Council, from the Socialist Peoples Party and the Danish Folk Party (rightwing populist party), (both from parties that voted against the law), the chairman of the Danish Federation of Trade Unions which has close bonds with the Social Democratic Party and a Swedish board member, who embodies the regional embeddedness of the project.

7. The "exceptionality" procedures of the UDP

The primacy of project and market-led redevelopment over comprehensive planning and existing regulatory plans and procedures was very manifest in design phase . The Danish UDP represents a clear case of "exceptionality" (Moulart, Swyngedouw and Rodriguez, 1999) in relation to existing planning instruments and regulations - a fact which from the

beginning became a controversial feature of the project. The new solution was criticised for being a hybrid: one the one hand an autonomous private shareholder company, on the other hand a public/public partnership with a financial base in the form of a state guaranteed credit line of some 850 million Euro (which was later to be increased). The adherents argued that the ODC combined "the best of two worlds": public control without the "snaring bonds" of politics and capable of operating on market terms.

The feature of "exceptionality"was modified in the phases of implementation in which the Masterplan and the sequence of sub plans was passed through procedures of public debates and political negotiations in the City Council in accordance with existing planning procedures.

The first step was an architectural competition. When the prospect for the competition was finished in April 1994, a critique was raised based on the alleged lack of architectural substance. The critique came amongst others from 21 leading Danish architects and was especially directed towards the involvement of the
Danish Architects National Association and the Danish Academic Architects Society as secretaries in the competition. The content of the critique was that the project was not embedded in a coherent vision of sustainable city of the future, the needs of the neighbourhoods and that the whole idea of a "**compact hyper growth district**" was not sufficiently substantiated (Larsen/Paludan, 2000) The Masterplan of the Orestadsproject from 1995 included parts of the critique on the architectural and aesthetical aspects of the project.. This was crucial to the image of the project as continious professional critisicm would have damaged the sophisticated image to future potential investors - not least public institutions. However w.r.t. the "elitist image" of the new town district - e.g. the type of housing estates- remained unchanged.

8. Governance dynamics in the phase of implementation

The mayor problem which was evident around 1996/97 was the disappointing low level of private investments. Hence the mobilisation of (semi)public partners to invest in the project became crucial for the image of the ODC.

The irony is that the financial concept in the design phase was presented as more or less cost neutrality for public budgets, because urban rent would finance the investments. What happened so far in the implementation was massive increase in use of public credits and costly (re)directions of public investments to the UDP. In the public the criticism of the financial reliability was articulated by the United Left Party already in 1997 and later picked up by the influential business magazine Monday Morning. According to these analyses the ODC had used almost all the credit and since the revenue of the land sale did not cover the

expenses, this would lead to "death by interest". This means that the compounded interest on the debt for the construction of the Metro and the infrastructure of the Oerestad will exceed the revenue produced from the Metro and the selling of land. The analysis estimated that the project was likely to cost the taxpayers 1-2 billion Euro.

For the growth coalition the present situation of the Danish UDP half way through the implementation phase is characterised by at "point of no return" - as the present Social Democratic Minister of Traffic termed it in one of the debates in the Danish Parliament. Despite the ongoing crossing of the original budget the growth coalition is still characterised by a "Spirit of the three Musketeers", who invested their political prestige in the belief in offensive entrepreneurialism. The calculations seem to be that the political and economical costs by accepting increased public investments is lower than opening up for a fundamental economic and legal reorganisation of the UDP.

Throughout the implementation the original calculations have proven to be too optimistic. Hence the amount of the credits and the period for the payback of credits (so far from around 11 years to around 20-30 years) has been prolonged several times.

The figures below illustrate the potential revenue from the sale of land to private investors and the actual revenue generated.

Total potential revenue from land already sold:	**57,000,000**	**3.30%**
Total realised revenue from land already sold:	**12,000,000**	**0.68%**
Total initial calculated revenue:	**1,739,000,000**	**100.00%**
Source: Andersen, Hougaard and Jensen, 1999.		

The largest single sale to private investors was when a consortium bought land in 1997 to build a large shopping centre of 330,000 square metres at 269 Euro per square metre.
However there were certain conditions to the deal: the ODC should get an exception from the national law on regional planning under the responsibility of the Ministry of Environmental affairs, which defines maximum sizes of shopping centres in order to protect smaller enterprises. The association of retailers in Copenhagen rejected the project since it might undermine their market share. Environmental organisations and a number of planners argued that since the project would require several thousand parking lots it was in accordance with the "green" image of the new district. In the spring 2000 the Social Democratic Minister of Environmental affairs finally decided that the shopping mall could be build - albeit with a slightly reduced size. Once again the critics argued that the ODC supporters accepted that a market driven logic decided the run of politics.

The critics argue that the growth coalition has organised a sequence of financial supportive actions. They argue that (i) a large part of the stated income is speculative due to the condi-

tional contracts with some of the larger private investors and (ii) the other part is public investments for the tax payers money - including pure "gifts" from the state. This argument refers to the fact that the Ministry of Finance in 1994 in its yearly negotiation with the Municipality of Copenhagen agreed to pay 25 Mio. EURO to the Municipality for three building sites at the Harbour Front, which they had shared ownership to. The total value was 70 million. EURO. This discrete state contribution was passed on to the ODC. Similar financial manoeuvres is planned by the growth coalition, but with higher financial volumes. The plan is that the Copenhagen Harbour Company (CHC) which operates under a construction similar to that of the ODC, should hand over a substantial part of its building cites to the State Property Company, FREJA - and the ODC. Via the planned operation of including the substantial parts of the CHC sites in a co-ordinated state controlled framework including the ODC a lot of possibilities for additional state contributions are likely to occur.

The operations of the CHC have been criticised within the public discourse and from professional associations along similar lines as the ODC: the emphasis on market driven development on the many building sites on the Copenhagen Harbour Front tend to exclude districts and politicians from controlling and deciding the City planning. But unlike the ODC, the CHC have so far ousted the ODC an have by far been more successful in creating income from selling building sites to private investors. The economic success of the CHC has caused legal struggles between the Copenhagen City Hall and the State, because the Danish Parliament in 1999 decided that parts of the revenue should finance investments in improvements of the railways in the Greater Copenhagen area.

The dominant actor in the ongoing efforts to reallocate a number of (semi) public institutions to the Orestad was the Ministry of Finance. During 1998 the Ministry encouraged public institutions to pay attention to the Orestad building sites, if they considered to move their offices. The Ministry promised to be helpful to find additional resources since the price of building sites in the Orestad are some of the highest in the Region
These efforts have been successful and have so far resulted in the following decisions:

Project	**Public investments in Euro**	
The university of Copenhagen	228,000,000	(over 7-10 years)
IT Highschool	48,000.000	(over 3 years)
Research Park	46,000.000	(over 3 years)
The National Archive and the Royal Library	202.000.000	(over 5 years)
The National Television	269.000.000	(over 5 years)
Psychiatric Hospital	5.000	(over 3 years)
Opera House	40.000	(over 3 years)
Total	823.000.000	

Source : Andersen, Hougaard and Jensen, 1999.

In addition to the public investments the general state credit was increased with 200 million Euro in 1999. The original state credit of 850 million Euro was now in excess of 1 billion Euro .

This sequence of events have occasionally been used to question the general legitimacy of the type of governance which the ODC embodies. One major problem in the implementation of large-scale UDPs is that the "point of no return" makes it difficult to redirect UDPs once they are set in motion. UDPs have a very strong element of "politics of gambling", which tends to follow a logic of *irreversibility*. As discussed above this caused several disputes in the parliament about the efficiency of the public control of financial transactions and responsibility for budget exceed.

In the Danish case the growth coalition became successful in constructing the policy and planning agenda to a choice between the **defensive stagnation** scenario and the **offensive globalisation scenario.** The critics claim that the presentation and calculation about benefits and risks were too optimistic and seductive. The growth coalition and the ODC argues that the bridge to Sweden will change the building site market and the ODC will be able to increase its income from land sale substantially. In so far as this strategy will work the progressive element in the Danish UDP package, is the idea of investing the urban rent in a *public good*: a new Metro.
At the Municipal level the possible future financial costs due to the crisis of the ODC has been articulated by the United Left and other members of the Copenhagen City Council. The critics have calculated that the price for paying back the debts of the ODC will be an increased tax level of 0.7 pct. for 20 years.

In case of a successful project the Orestad will substantially add to the number of jobs (the ODC anticipates up to 50,000 additional jobs) and up to 10,000 high-income households. The project might be able to attract high income citizens to settle in the Orestad - instead of e.g. the richer northern municipalities outside Copenhagen. This would have a positive impact on the municipal budget. In terms of the social geography, a successfully developed Orestad is supposed to be an internationally "exclusive" orientated district. The possible negative side effect could be a polarising path of development in the social geography - instead of modifying and bridging the social, cultural and economic forces of the affluent and the less affluent in the transitions towards the post industrial City.

In the future implementation there is still possibilities for opening up for housing for other than high income residents and open for a more socially and income mixed population. Furthermore some room of manoeuvre exists for the stimulation of synergy effects between the Orestad development and strategies for socio-economic improvements benefiting the inhabitants of the deprived neighbourhoods - e.g. development of service sector jobs, social economy initiatives etc. So far such politically planned and negotiated "trickle down ef-

fects" have only played a marginal role within the professional public and political discourse. At present there are no signs from the growth coalition behind the project that points to a change of the "elitist" profile of the project. It would be against the economic and symbolic rationality of the project as the spearhead of the elite in the post industrial urban space. However depending on future economical and political dynamics this discussion could be present in the future decisions on redirections of the project. This is not least due to the new orientations in national urban policy, which emphasise the problem of segregation and the need of a new holistic oriented urban policy (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 1999) This will be discussed in the following.

9. Social cohesion and the Entrepreneurial City - can they coexist?

The present situation of urban governance is characterised by ambivalence and conflicting agendas: The two faces of present Urban Policy and governance are

1. The "Schumpetarian" strategic growth policy which sets the agenda at State, regional and City Hall level.

2. At district level the decentralisation programme of elected district councils in Copenhagen - and reinvented participatory planning instruments supported by national funded social action programmes pull in another direction.

The missing links between the UDP/ the dominating strategy for economic growth and the programmes for social renewal in the deprived urban areas concerned with social sustainability and the avoidance of polarisation of the social geography constitute the most striking – and perhaps innovative - paradox in the ongoing dispute over Danish - and EU - urban policy.

Seen from today's perspective, it is obvious that the urban movements and the left in Copenhagen was much less powerful in influencing the orientation and management of growth policy and the larger revitalisation strategy. The red-green part of the political landscape was excluded from the new powerful growth policy networks. However the voice of community activist has re-entered the urban scene since the mid nineties, not least due to the state initiated implementation of area based social action programmes in deprived districts since the mid nineties inspired by former social renewal projects and by the EU Poverty 3 programme (Andersen & Larsen, 1995).

However the limits of these actions are their **localist and socio-cultural** orientation. Structural socio-economic issues and the linkage to the broader revitalisation strategy is almost non existent – despite the fact that the national programme has a strong rhetoric

about the necessity of such linkages.Hence the social action and social renewal programmes for the deprived districts live a life of their own with marginal links to the City and regional entrepreneurial growth strategy. Hence a ambiguous duality can be identified between (i) the strategy for economic revitalisation dominated by neocorporative, elitist governance and (ii) the area based programmes for the deprived districts influenced by planning ideas of social mobilisation (Friedmann, 1987) and community empowerment (Craig and Mayo, 1995)

This dualism is also manifest at the state level. Since the late nineties, the duality have been tried overcome with arguments for a new holistic oriented urban policy (Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 1999), which to some extent echoes the participatory and welfare oriented planning paradigms of the seventies (Worm et, al., 1984) in order to avoid a market driven City entrepreneurialism and (re)**link** economic, social, spatial and physical objectives and rationalities of urban development.

At the state administrative level this policy orientation also follows an institutional logic, because the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Housing want to challenge the monolistic role of the Ministry of Financial Affairs, which had the dominating role in the design of the Danish UDP. Hence at the state level a growing tension can be identified between the Ministry of Financial Affairs, which emphasises the entrepreneurial aspect of urban governance whereas the Ministry of Urban Affairs and Housing emphasises the need for comprehensive urban policy.

Hence the present urban policy orientation in Denmark can best be described as **ambivalent**, but perhaps innovative in the sense that the objective of linking social, ecological and economic objectives has been now been more clearly articulated. This situation might create a new open terrain and stimulate innovation/learning and policy orientation from the local as well as the national and EU level.

10. Towards a new agenda for urban governance.

From the social polarisation angle, which have been the *leitmotif* of the entire URSPIC-project, the analysis leads us to identify the challenge as:

- Development of holistic policy objectives (taking social, ecological, aesthetic and economic considerations into account): in order to be sure that UDPs are part of a coherent regional socio-economic strategy.
- (Re) development of participatory planning and policy instruments, which stimulates local participation/community empowerment and transparency of good practice and learning at across the local, regional, national and transnational levels. In terms of governance this

includes efforts to include partners usually excluded from growth policy network– e.g. third sector, Social Housing Associations and agencies representing deprived neighbourhoods.

The challenge of the New Inclusion Policy (NIP) - is to:
(i) Integrate actors representing interest at the bottom of the social ladder and foster coalitions between excluded groups and sections of working and middle classes and
(ii) enable the actors to operate across different spatial levels: The forces of social polarisation operates across the scale and hence the forces of inclusion cannot operate exclusively on local, regional or national levels.

From a social polarisation angle the lack of collective action from the bottom is the problem. The ability to organise collective action (empowerment) and political representation from the bottom - and therefore the presence of organised conflictive relationship between the affluent and the less affluent - is a condition for reaching sustainable development: Social inclusion and integration is impossible without social conflict. The *socially productive, transformative conflicts* can be defined as conflicts which encourage mutual understanding and social learning of collective and individual actors and hence reduce transactions costs and enhance social capital; the norms and networks facilitating collective action for mutual benefit (Andersen, 1999)

This presupposes a new social economy strategy, where the economic aspects are re-embedded in the social, and the effective co-ordination of institutional arrangements creating structured coherence, at the micro-, meso-, macro- and meta-levels, to ensure the dynamic complementarity of the social economy with the wider economic system (Jessop, 1998).

Generally speaking this could be supported at the level of system integration by a combination of universalist social citizenship rights and politics of "positive selectivism" e.g. empowerment oriented urban social action programs in deprived neighbourhoods. When they work, they empower local actors and transform the public agencies and the professional complex in a more supportive direction and give rise to empowering or "inclusive localism". But without more far-reaching changes in the socio-economic regime, which among other things can break the trend towards polarisation of the social geography local empowerment strategies are likely to fail (Andersen, 1999).

11. Conclusion

In the design phase, and at least in the first part of the implementation phase, the growth coalition and the UDP leadership mobilised a strong discursive power due to their successful construction of the agenda for future social, aesthetic and economic development. Un-

like the "New Developers" - capable of leading the City in to the postmodern world - the critics were associated with old-fashioned "politics of resistance" or labelled as "idealistic radical democrats" and thus in part excluded from the influential policy networks. This situation of asymmetrical relations of power created very difficult conditions for the linkage of urban (re)development with notions of inclusion and social justice.

The new urban governance, where decision-making power is transferred to relatively autonomous agencies, raises the question about the need for institutionalised **alternative expertise** in the design and implementation process. The logic of this argument is that if the need for particular types of "Entrepreneurial Governance" cannot be ignored the access to "alternative elites" and representation and voices for actors **outside** the neo-elitist governance networks becomes crucial in order to avoid asymmetrical relations of power in the policy process. This relates to the problem of subsidiarity - the division of tasks and competence between local/district level, City, Region, State and EU levels. The Danish case suggest two lessons:
- the importance of active involvement (and the existence) *of lower levels of government within the City* (e.g.elected district or neighbourhood councils). Deprived districts needs their own political and institutional platform in order to articulate their demands.
- the importance of an elected *regional government* to balance the power of autonomous closed elitist policy networks operating on the regional scale

The politically created **absence** of a regional level of government was one among other factors, which created at situation of dislocation with regard to adequate democratic regulations of urban re-development. In the Copenhagen case actors in the professional planning complex took the role as initial policymakers and via their corporate networks they succeeded in opening a new "strategic terrain": the formation of a new Metropolitan growth regime.

To sum up, the remaining challenge is the development of a holistic and participatory form of government and governance with emphasis on the distribution of a total set of living conditions: housing, social services, employment, education etc. In Denmark there were attempts to develop this type of planning in the late seventies (Worm et.al, 1984) and these ideas have re-entered the present political and professional discourse, but so far without linkages to the neo-corporative entrepreneurial discourse. The question remains: how to bridge the two worlds?

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Spatialization and Culturalization of Social Policy: Conducting Marginal People in Local Communities

BY

Jørgen Elm Larsen

Summary

Danish social policy has increasingly become spatialized and culturalized and fused with housing policy. This is, however, not a unique Danish policy development. There are at least two tendencies in European countries, which point in this direction. Firstly, there has occurred a concentration of socially excluded people in certain districts of almost every major European City. Secondly, there has at the same time been an emphasis on local community's own ability and efforts to revitalise the physical, cultural and social environment and to create job opportunities.

Denmark is an interesting case in this new urban governance scenario. In the latter part of the 1990's Denmark witnessed a 'miracle' with high employment and low inflation, but at the same time there are local areas, which have not been able to benefit from this in terms of lower unemployment. The lesson to be learned from the Danish case is that it has not been possible so far to guarantee all people employment and social integration despite favourable economic conditions and comprehensive political efforts to do so.

In a situation where marginal people are concentrated in certain local areas it seems necessary to take a critical stance towards the new urban governance. In doing so, this paper is focusing on how the deprived city district of Copenhagen, Kongens Enghave, is conducting marginal people.[1] It is concluded that to strengthening a deprived community's social capital and other forms of capital there is a need to be looking both inside and outside the neighbourhood or local community. Spatialized and culturalized social policy can only be encompassing and enabling if it is combined with a politics of redistribution.

1. European cities and social exclusion

Especially during the latter part of the 1990's the theme of social exclusion in cities became a central political and research issue. All major European cities have experienced increasing concentration of social problems in certain urban areas. Globalisation, migration and social exclusion are often the keywords employed to explain this process of spatial concentration of especially long-term unemployed and immigrant and ethnic minority communities (Healey et al. 1995, Jewson and MacGregor 1997, Madanipour et al. 1998).

In the United States, there has been a long-standing public and research interest in urban poverty. In the 1980's the much debated concept of an urban 'ghetto underclass' was

[1] The article is based on a comprehensive local area study in the city district of Kongens Enghave in Copenhagen. In this article the focus is especially on how the conduct of marginal people is mediated through different 'places-to-be' in the local community. The empirical data presented in the article is based on studies of "drop-in centres" ("væresteder") for mentally ill, drug addicts and other marginal or lonely people and of workfare or activation projects (Larsen and Schultz 2000 and 2001). The local area study is part of the research programme 'Gender, Empowerment and Politics' which is financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council 1996-2001.

developed to describe the inhabitants of urban inner city areas with high concentration of, among other phenomena's, poverty, unemployment, crime, teen-age pregnancy and lone motherhood (refer for example to Auletta 1982, Murray 1984, Wilson 1987, Katz 1989, Wilson 1993). The underclass debate also crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the late 1980's (Macnicol 1987, Field 1989, Murray 1990). While the underclass debate was also, as in the US, heated in UK it never occupied the same centrality in the rest of Europe. Here, instead the concept of social exclusion was at the centre in discussions of issues like poverty, unemployment, and ethnic minorities (Silver 1994).

One could argue that the concept of an underclass by and large has been dismissed in the political and scientific discourse on social exclusion in Europe. However, what was adapted from the American discourse was the concept of the ghetto, which especially in the 1990's re-emerged in the European debate on cities and social exclusion (for example O'Loghlin and Friedrichs 1995, Mingione 1996, Diken 1998, Bourdieu et al. 1999).

Wacquant (1993, 1996 and 1999) dismisses the idea that there are ghettos in the large European cities such as for example Paris, in the same scale and segregated manner that they exist in larger American cities. On the other hand, he argues that it is possible to point out a number of general characteristics around the development in the Western nations that have led to the development of a phenomenon that he describes as "advanced marginality" in the larger cities.[2] Structural and political causes, especially in relation to jobs, the housing market and the management of the public housing stock, do lie behind these growing concentrations of socially excluded people but many of these structural factors are to be found in local conditions (Payne 2000, Saraceno 2000, Glennerster et al. 1999, Power 1997 and 1999, Layard 1997, Wilson 1996). Accordingly, governmental strategies for tackling social exclusion and welfare dependency have been decentralised (Finn 2000).

In this urban scenario a new way of governing is rising, in that community has become a spatialization of government. The old welfare state regimes are everywhere undergoing transformations. There is a move from a 'welfare society' to an 'active society' (Walters 1997) and with this a move from 'citizenship rights' to 'active citizenship'. The implication here off is '... a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own future well-being and upon their own obligation to take active steps to secure this' (Rose: 1996: 327-28). This new governmental way is especially located to the English-speaking world, but the same tendencies are present in a number of Nordic countries (Rose 1999). Rose terms this new governmental way as *government through community*. It is characterised by a governing '... through regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous actors in context of their particular commitments to families and communities' (Rose 1996: 328). Urban renewal programmes, for example, try to reinvent and reconstruct certain inner-

[2] In a parallel fashion, Castells uses the term black holes of informational capitalism to describe those "... regions of society from which, statistically speaking, there is no escape from the pain and destruction inflicted on the human conditions for those who, in one way or another, enter these social landscapes" (Castells 1998: 162). These black holes can be found in every country. They are in a world of its own which he calls the Forth World.

city areas as 'communities' by mobilising local groups and actors in these community construction projects. In these community construction processes marginal people are to be 'empowered' by experts teaching and coaching them to conduct themselves in relation to some particular norms and to be able to achieve rational self-management.

Even though there are common trends in European countries concerning the concentration of socially excluded people in certain urban districts and the emphasis of community renewal in the overall policy approach there are, however, also major differences between the European countries. The specific way in which social and housing policy confronts social exclusion in cities depends on earlier policy traditions in each country, a path or past dependency in policy developments (Pierson 1998). The rhetoric about revitalising communities may be very similar in, for example Denmark and UK, but existing socio-economic structures, institutions and actors shape the way in which urban restructuring is taking place. Different welfare regimes are often approaching the same phenomena's with different means or they apply the same governmental technology, for example 'work fare', in rather diverse ways.

2. New Urban Governance in Denmark

The active intervention and regulation by the state of the social spaces has been a prominent characteristic of the political urban and housing discourse and activity in Denmark in the 1990's. A very intensive political discourse has been in progress around ghetto-producing processes, and these have been addressed with relatively extensive activities on the local level in socially disadvantaged housing areas.

The core idea of the new urban governance in Denmark in the 1990s has been that the local communities should be self-supporting and self-regulating (By- og Boligministeriet 1999/The Ministry of City and Housing). Every district of the city has to be a city within the city, with its own governance structure, enterprise structure, places of employment, housing estates, cultural and sporting facilities etc. However, to be able to address these needs it has been vital to reconstruct the local social infrastructure and social networks. In essence, the new urban governance has been directed towards the recreation of 'gemeinschaft' and community feeling and identity.[3] The social and cultural dimension of city planning has therefore come to the fore in the new urban governance regime (Pløgger 1999). Rose has argued that the most distinctive feature of this new governing is that "It is a moral field binding persons into durable relations. It is a space of *emotional relationships* through which *individual identities* are constructed through their bonds to *micro-cultures* of values and meanings." (Rose 1999: 172) There is a growing anxiety about community's loss of social coherence, power to produce social integration and their lack of informal surveillance and informal control processes (Pløgger 2000). When it is no longer possible to maintain or create homogeneous communities, the existence or fabrication of devices and technologies to help building dif-

[3] The new urban governance rethoric certainly resemble the communitarian idea (see for example Etzioni (1995). For a critique of the communitarian idea and especially in relation to city life see for example Young (1990).

ferent spaces of social integration is vital for the overall well being of the community. There have to be secure and friendly public spaces, which can offer a sense of meaning and identity, a sense of belonging to place and community. The new urban governance in Denmark has adopted such a spatialized cultural approach in its planning rhetoric. Contemporary Danish urban communities are not stable in the sense that there is high mobility in and out of places and housing areas and lacking socio-cultural homogeneity. Cultural constructivism is therefore increasingly by governmental institutions and actors seen as a way of improving the quality of peoples every-day life and especially in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of socially excluded people.

3. The "Danish Urban Committee"

The "Danish Urban Committee" ("Byudvalget") was established in 1993 with the purpose of addressing problems related to social housing estates.[4] There had been an increase in social problems within several social housing estates. Political attention was especially focused on housing estates with a high concentration of immigrants and refugees. Even though the proportion of immigrants and ethnic minorities in Denmark is relatively low compared with most other European countries, the formation of ethnic minority communities, or 'ghettos' as they are called in the public and political discourse, was a major reason for the Danish Urban and housing policy of the 1990's.

The inclusion of the local areas and their inhabitants into the planning and administration process points towards two new tendencies in Danish urban administration. Firstly, a rhetorical distancing from hierarchical planning and management, and secondly, an attempt to elicit and utilise the inhabitants' and the citizens' own resources. The Urban Committee's work, particularly the Local Area Improvement Projects, are an indicator of an administrative strategy where the government's main goals are to be proactive against "ghettorization" and improve the quality of life in the city and housing areas. This strategy has to be combined with identifying the problems and solutions of the local participants and institutions.

In line with these new trends in urban administration, the Urban Committee launched a programme that utilised two strategies. Firstly, a local networking strategy aimed at improving living conditions for tenants and reducing social problems by mobilising locally based resources and initiatives. Secondly, a strategy of an improved competitive position aimed at improving the locality's competitive position in the housing market so as to attract more resource-strong groups into the localities. [5]

[4] The Urban Committee was established as a collaboration between six ministeries. The agenda consisted of a 30 points action plan, including sporting, social and cultural elements – and indeed symbolic elements with the purpose of improving the reputation of the deprived areas. About 500 housing estates have received some kind of support in the period from 1994 to 1998.

[5] There are a whole pile of evaluation reports in relation to the effects of the efforts and initiatives made by the Danish Urban Committee (for example Vestergaard et al. 1997; Munk 1999; Skifter Andersen 1999a,1999b and 2000; Vestergaard et al 1999). In general, the evaluations of the initiatives of the Urban Committee conclude that the segregation processes have been contained or prevented from escalating, even though the social problems have not yet been solved.

The most ambitious initiative by The Urban Committee has been 'The Local Area Improvement Projects'. Seven areas in Denmark were chosen for pilot projects in relation to the programme. The idea behind the Local Area Improvement Programme is an integrated and holistic attempt to solve the problems in deprived areas. The local area improvement projects are based on the ability to gather together local efforts and networks. The chosen areas are therefore not only characterised by deprivation but also by the existence of comprehensive locally based resources, for example strong and active tenant organisations. The area "Kongens Enghave" in Copenhagen is one of the chosen areas for the Local Area Improvement Projects. By Danish standards Kongens Enghave is considered an extremely disadvantaged area. This city district has the highest percentage of unemployment in Denmark and the average income is very low. At the same time, however, Kongens Enghave represents a lively civil society with many active organisations as well as many formal and informal social activities. Kongens Enghave can more precisely be understood as a traditional local working class community within a post-traditional and post-industrial metropolis.

4. The Copenhagen working class village in Kongens Enghave

To talk of a local community or society means that one is able to identify long-lasting constellations of economic and political institutions and actors, of kinship, family life and civic culture (Saraceno 2000; Putnam 1993). In this sense, Kongens Enghave can be defined as a local community. Since the beginning of the last century, Kongens Enghave has been characterised by a proliferation of co-operatives and strong social networks. In many ways, it was seen as a working class village on the periphery of the capital. Kongens Enghave was a place where people wanted to settle down because of the excellent accommodation and close social bonds (Kongens Enghave, 1997: 10). The district thus attracted both white collar and skilled workers.

From the middle of the 1960's the development of the district starts to undergo a change. First, the more affluent citizens start to move from apartments into freestanding villas. Second, the attractiveness of the district is eroded by large-scale bridge and railway construction. These transport infrastructures divide the district into separate and self-sufficient areas. The district was the victim of indiscriminate town planning in the name of progress. Third, there was no redevelopment of the existing estates so that they could satisfy the demand for more space, and no new buildings are erected in the district. Many of the 1 ½ to 2 room apartments (70% of all apartments) were particularly not suited to families with children, and the number of families with children dropped sharply. Fourth, because of the great decrease in available and affordable accommodation due to large scale urban renewal in the inner city, many lower income families had to move because of increasing rents, and many moved to Kongens Enghave because of the availability of lower rents there.

Thus, the previously attractive housing available in Kongens Enghave gradually started to accommodate the more economically disadvantaged. Particularly from the 1980's on,

the district also begins to be utilised by the municipality of Copenhagen as an area for the relocation of the economically and socially disadvantaged: lone mothers, early retirees and long-term social benefit recipients. Among the early retirees and the long-term social benefit recipients there are also a large portion of drug addicts, alcoholics and/or mentally ill. In addition, homeless people frequent the area and those services that the area makes available. The latest gentrification of the inner-city area of Vesterbro has pushed some of the drug addicts, homeless people and low-income households out of Vesterbro and into Kongens Enghave.

Due to these developments, the district of "Kongens Enghave" is to day a low class status area in the Copenhagen environment with a high concentration of unemployed and socially excluded people. The district is often described as the "forgotten part of town" – in the sense that it ignored and forgotten, and that it is neglected and misused.[6] The district is often seen as and described by those outside of it, but also by its own inhabitants as being socially disadvantaged. However, typically many of the local inhabitants that have lived there all or most of their lives, see many good qualities associated with it and want to stay living there (Bille and Lund 1979, Gut 2000). This is not least due to the fact that most people still perceive Kongens Enghave's public spaces as friendly and communicative. But as in many other deprived districts of European cities, Kongens Enghave is experiencing a 'crisis of reproduction' of the working class and its culture (Fowler 1996) and this especially apply to unskilled working class men (Andersen and Larsen 1998).

5. City District Council Experiments and the Local Area Improvement Project in Kongens Enghave

Recently Kongens Enghave has been more in the limelight than what has been the case for many years, and this is mainly because the district is participating in the Copenhagen City District Council Experiment and the Local Area Improvement Projects. Via these initiatives there has been an increase in the area's political clout, and a certain sense of optimism with regard to the future can be sensed among the inhabitants.

The Copenhagen City Council approved the City District Council Experiment in 1995. With certain restrictions, four districts of Copenhagen gained self-government and control over financial resources to run their local welfare provisions. That Kongens Enghave at the same time was selected as a Local Area Improvement Project, provided the opportunity for a unique experiment in local political decision making and the development of new social and housing policies.

In Kongens Enghave it was decided to spend most of the available district improvement funds on housing renovation. The district improvement here has been defined by 15 local working groups, that have provided suggestions on how the district's housing fa-

[6] A symptomatic example of how the district is perceived and used by the Copenhagen City Council is that during the "Great Nordic Biker War" in the mid 1990s it was suggested that the Hell's Angel group should be relocated from the city district of Nørrebro to Kongens Enghave.

cilities, traffic conditions, social and cultural facilities could be improved, and at the same improve it's image in the eyes of the rest of the population of Copenhagen.[7] The steering committee for the local area improvement project in Kongens Enghave has defined the urban renewal project as one without forced exiting of marginal people. However, experiences from most other areas and other experimental social policy programmes show that many socially and economically well-functioning tenants are reluctant or reject making contact with and taking responsibility for the less well-functioning tenants and citizens in the local area (Vestergaard 1998). Those that are functioning well socially and economically find the presence of marginalized individuals and groups with destructive, disruptive, threatening or deviant behaviour, a very unpleasant intrusion into their daily lives, and makes them dissatisfied with life in at risk housing. The problem with the placement of the most disadvantaged citizens is intensified by the lack of a concentrated social effort in relation to the mentally ill, drug addicts etc. These problems are an important part of the background for the problems in Kongens Enghave, and they are problems that in them selves cannot be solved at the local level (Andersen 2000).

The spatial ordering of social and economic relations is reproduced or even reinforced if the basic structuring forces and powers stay unchallenged. Area-based initiatives are improper to "... provide solutions to problems whose causes are national or even international" (Nolan and Whelan 2000). A lot of community constructing projects is, in the end, leading to isolation, because they isolate areas and groups from the city as a whole (Harvey 1997). The local state may provide services and resources, which disadvantaged area's need, but it is often done in ways, which reproduce and confirm existing relations of power and oppression (Geddes 1997). The attempt to direct assistance towards particularly underprivileged or problem areas via specially focussed urban renewal and social initiatives has not necessarily only positive impacts on a local area. First, by focussing on an area, there is the risk of stigmatising it via public opinion and/or a self-stigmatisation by those who live in the area. Secondly, the renewal of housing in an area may result in such an increase in rent charges that the poorest part of the population can no longer afford to pay this rent and are thus forced to move elsewhere. One of the most pressing questions for urban development in Kongens Enghave is that, as there is a regeneration of housing, jobs and the urban environment, then there is a risk that those most disadvantaged in the district actually will be forced to move out. At the same time, it is clear that the concentration of strongly marginalized groups in particular areas of the Copenhagen city space, and particularly in Kongens Enghave, can only be addressed if overall in Copenhagen there occurs a reallocation of resources and responsibility for caring for and supporting the marginalized groups. An understanding of and about the "exclusion field" is however, a prerequisite for handling the urban and housing policies in such a way that there does not occur a further exclusion of the marginalized groups. A key component of such an understanding is particularly associated with the importance of the marginalized spaces as places where people live and exist,

[7] Kongens Enghave has in total received about 250 million DKK (33,5 million EURO) to carry out the local area improvement project. A hole range of projects has been developed covering, for example, housing renovation (the main target area), employment projects, improvements of the physical and social environment, and cultural activities (Kongens Enghave 1998).

and those communities and identities that are produced and are represented in such places.

6. The Functions of Drop-In Centres in Kongens Enghave

Disciplining, controlling and punishing poor people are often seen as an intrinsic part of social policy. The modern prisons, poor and workhouses certainly had such functions and some scholars and politicians also regard some of the contemporary workfare programmes and projects in the same way. However, self-discipline and self-control works much more indirectly, smoothly and often cost less money than external discipline and control. Identity or self-identity is a central condition for self-control and self-discipline (White 1992). When work disappears or never became an option, the wage-earner identity either fades away or is never established as part of a person's identity. Some unemployed people find other ways of coping and creating an identity. But many unemployed people without family, kinship or other close social relations often feel rootless. In this context various types of drop-in centres can function as identity-creating entities and can thus contribute to the creation of self-discipline and self-control. But first and foremost the publicly financed and NGO managed drop-in centres for mentally ill persons (and other users) in Kongens Enghave function as places where it is possible for socially excluded people to receive care.

The drop-in centres do not provide the same time related, spatial, physical, and mentally disciplining effects that a 'workplace' elicits, as they do not place the same type of demands that a 'real' workplace requires. But in many cases, the drop-in centres' modus operandi have their own inbuilt discipline and identity creating functions, in that they generate and regulate interaction between people on the edge of society. The various types of drop-in centres in Kongens Enghave create possibilities for social contact and a certain amount of regularity in daily life.

Drug addicts, the mentally ill, alcoholics, long-term unemployed, social security benefits recipients, early retirees and pensioners are considered by many to have too much "spare time". As many of these people live on their own and some are homeless, then they have a need for places-to-be that can take up their free time and allow contact with other people. Their place of living or their home is often not the places where this interaction with others can occur, and the home is thus often experienced as a place of loneliness.

The challenge posed to the new urban governance is to fuse housing and social policy in such a way that it constructs a sense of meaning and identity for marginal people as well as for the community as a whole. This is done by constructing different kinds of communities for different kinds of people or (sub)cultures within the local community. The new urban governance and its discursive planning rhetoric is staging communities as representational spaces, that is spaces with distinct discourses and practices aiming at producing meanings and identity feelings. As a part of this new urban governance I therefore conceive 'places-to-be' for marginal people as a *'politics of marginal space'*.

Because meaning is a product of social spatialization (Bauman 1993) the spatialization and culturalization of social policy or the politics of marginal space can be seen as a means of constructing places of meaning as well as places of 'conduct of conduct'.[8] As places of 'conduct of conduct' these marginal places-to-be functions as mediators and stabilisers of the relations between marginal people and the rest of the local community. These marginal places, by creating meanings and identity feeling for the inhabitants, are lowering potential tensions and conflicts in the community. They are producers and constructors of feelings of safety and trust in the local community.

The most obvious marginal spaces in Kongens Enghave are the three drop-in centres for the mentally ill, "Pegasus", "Amadeus", and "Café Rose". However, other than these, there are other informal drop-in centres, particularly the two drinking clubs that meet in an old shed and an old carriage on Danish Rail property. As well as this there are a number of marginal spaces in the rest of the district, such as "The Shit Channel" which is an area of self-erected buildings around a sewer outlet[9] and the old Harbour, and other ad-hoc gathering spots in plazas, squares and streets. These *places-to-be* are marginal areas in the public space where people and particularly the socially excluded and mentally ill, take refuge in the short or long term.

6.1. Drop-in Centre's for the Mentally Ill

The goal of the drop-in centres was primarily to offer social contact and activity to mentally ill citizens. At the beginning of the 1990's a number of drop-in centres were established, either by the municipality itself or by the municipality in co-operation with volunteer organisations such as "The Church Cross Army" ("Kirkens Korshær") and "The Mission Among the Homeless" ("Missionen blandt Hjemløse"). In most instances it was a case of resources from the Ministry of Social Affair's various experimental social policy budgets with a focus to provide "care" in contrast to welfare state type offers of "treatment". It was important that the drop-in centres were a safe haven for the addicts, and that they themselves had a saying about the gatherings and activities. As an example of this it was a major condition of operation that the drop-in centres were not obligated to report back to the municipality, and that addicts could come and go anonymously.

Even though the drop-in centres formally had been established for the use of the mentally ill, then many different groups utilise them. It is particularly the homeless, drug addicts, early retirees and pensioners that utilise the centres.

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[8] Government was by Foucault (1982) defined by the 'conduct of conduct'. Government or the conduct of conduct can more precisely by defined as 'Any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and form of knowledge, that seeks to shape our conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.' (Dean 1999: 209).

[9] This area in the periphery of Kongens Enghave is inhibited by 'out cast' people who live in old caravans and shelters and without running water and electricity. In Denmark, this housing area is about the closest one can get in to something that resemble a third world slum area.

6.1.1. Food

The offer of a hot meal is the most common reason mentioned by the users of the centres when they explain why they come to the formal drop-in centres, or when they explain why it is good to come there. The reasons can be just as varied as the people themselves. For many addicts their lifestyles effectively mean that regular meals or the preparation of these, is not a priority. For many pensioners food preparation is a difficult and expensive task. Many of the mentally ill, particularly if they have been institutionalised for many years, need help with the practicalities of everyday life such as cooking. Most of the users of the drop-in centre are single men from an era where cooking was not a task done by the man in the home. Another situation is that most of the users of the centres are people that live alone and it is actually the case that it is cheaper and more sociable to eat there in the company of others. The food is actually an important key in getting the drop-in centres to function socially and it can act as a bridge allowing the establishment of contact with people.

6.1.2. Care

In whatever way the drop-in centre establish their activities and target group, it is a case of "being there", about "giving", and about "support". In all instances it is a case of meeting people under their own premises, about accepting them no matter where they are and how they are – and thus in many ways providing an alternative to the culture people for example encounter in the health system and in the social system. The care, in practice, can be seen on many levels. It applies equally to the attitude behind the work, in the actual work being done, and how it is done. In practice, it is about the tone that employees use, to what extent they involve themselves with individuals, their personal boundaries and the type of practical problems they take upon themselves to solve. The latter can be anything from being present at meetings a user has with the health or social systems, to just being there, *if* a user has the need to talk to someone. But it can also be to read out loud the TV programme for a mentally ill person who has never learned to read.

6.1.3. Room for differences

It is just as important to create space for everyone as creating space for the individual in the drop-in centre. This means that the staff sometimes has to control loud or other deviant behaviour so as to, among other things, protect the mentally ill who often are seen as the most disadvantaged of all the centre's users. Despite reprimands, or that a person is asked to go home to cool off and to come back tomorrow, then it is never the case that users are given extended expulsions or banned from the centre altogether. However the centres' goals of being open to all, can at times be made difficult because of the great cross-section of users. Some mentally ill people for example are not at ease when intoxicated users become loud, and older people may feel uneasy in the company of drug addicts.

Despite the drop-in centres having as target groups the mentally ill or people that are badly off, then the centres place emphasis on attracting users with somewhat more ad-

vanced social abilities. Among these are especially the pensioners. The inclusion of users that are more resource strong seems to have benefited the centres overall, and not only for the most disadvantaged users. Being able to be there for others, and to contribute, is also an important reason for coming to the drop-in centres.

A consequence of the social contact in the centres has been that the users often "look after each other". Attention is paid to whether someone has not been there for a couple of days, and if this is not done by the centre employees then it is often other users that go to a users home to see if anything is amiss. Caring for each other and self-regulation is also about intervening between people when one of the friends displays a too problematic behaviour: to tell him to shut up, and to remind him that there has to be room for everyone at the centre.

6.2. Drop-in Centre's for 'Beer-drinkers' and alcoholics

The idea behind the creation and placement of drop-in centres is not only about opportunities for the most disadvantaged. It can also be about moving the people that are different away from public spaces and places where they do not bother others, and/or where they can be watched and controlled. "The Carrot" is a good example of this scenario, in that its establishment came about for exactly this reason. In the past, "the beer drinkers" hung out on street corners, sat on benches, or sat on the steps to buildings in the Bavnehøj district.[10] The section along Enghave Road was popularly called "the longest bar in Denmark". However, the police have started issuing infringement notices and are "driving people off the streets".

The story behind the two informal drop-in centres in Kongens Enghave, the Carrot and the SV Drop-in centre, are both stories about attempts to get the beer drinkers off the streets. It is stories about establishing separate places-to-be for a group of people that did not fit into any of the other localities in the city district. But it is also about those communities that are based on the idea of having a chat and a beer.

Even though there are great similarities between user groups and the way they interact, then there are also great differences between the two drop-in centres. This is most noticeable by the way the two places are run on a day to day basis. At the SV Centre, it is a case of what could be called "self-regulation", in that the user committee has the responsibility for the daily running and organisation of the centre (for example cleaning). At the Carrot it is rather the case of "self-justice", in that there is no formal manager, management committee, or anyone with the day to day responsibility for the shed.

When the initial drop-in centre, the SV-centre, became a key-only club, then those that were not welcome in the shed had to drink on street corners again. However, after a period of time, a blue carriage was provided for all of these many people. At present, 10-15 people have keys to the carriage. It is normally open from mid-morning, how-

[10] Bavnehøj is one of the three major housing and living areas in Kongens Enghave. In Bavnehøj there are about 3.000 people, and in Frederiksholm and Musikbyen respectively 3.500 and 5.500 people.

ever, in contrast to the SV-Drop-in centre, then there are quite a number of people that use the Carrot during the day. The contact with others is an important reason for why people use the drop-in centre. The beer drinking also provides some of the answers for why the Carrot's users seldom, or only for short periods, use the city district's other formal drop-in centres. When they do use them, it is most often to get a hot meal.

Communion in the carrot is not only about beer and chatting. One of the things emphasised by the users is that it is nice that there are others that keep an eye on them, and check out how they are. This type of social contact is something that is often connected with the solidarity that existed in Kongens Enghave in "the good old days".

Even though it is better to have a place to hang out rather than being "hunted down by the police", and then there are both advantages and disadvantages associated with the Carrot. On one hand it is possible to be out of the weather, but on the other hand the carriage is much too small for the 40-50 people that normally visit the carrot during a day. The physical conditions of it are also determined by the fact that the Carrot is more exposed and closer to the road than the SV-Drop-in centre. This situation means that the users sometimes feel that they are on show in relation to the rest of the inhabitants of the district.

The third central spot where beer drinkers in Kongens Enghave congregate is "Mozarts Square" ("Mozarts Plads"). The square is circular, broken up by roads, but otherwise big and airy, with cobblestones, benches, flowerboxes and bushes. In one of the corners the "Info-Shop" is located. This is a small white wooden house, covered by notices, and with an open shutter that makes the house look like an ice-cream kiosk. The house is used for giving out information about cultural, social and political activities in the district, and has a couple of tables that function as a café for people in the district. The people that occupy Mozarts Square, primarily occupy the benches behind the Info-Shop, out of the way of the wind and the stares of passers by. Sometimes there are also people sitting on the benches on the other side of the square drinking beer, but the main meeting place is clearly behind the shop.

Those people that come to Mozarts Square to have a beer and talk with others, often come there every day, or at least daily during certain periods. They feel a connection to, and a responsibility for the square, demonstrated by keeping the place clean and tidy, and by removing all bottles and beer caps before they go home. In relation to the district there are both positive and negative consequences of the presence of the beer drinkers. On the one hand for example, the internal "self-regulation" results in the beer drinkers being tolerated. On the other hand, their presence has also been met with mistrust and uncertainty, particularly from the old peoples' homes on the other side of the square.

6.3. Drop-in centres for the unemployed who are activated

With the latest changes in Danish activation policies since 1998, virtually all registered unemployed people of 18 to 60 years of age have to engage in an activation programme, irrespective of their age and other social problems. Thus activation will eventually become a reality at some point or other for the large and mixed group of people that utilise the drop-in centres. The only exceptions being pensioners and clinically diagnosed mentally ill people.

There are two major reasons for the moral of the workfare or the activation measures. The first reason is that work is a (self)-disciplining factor, which determines where one is going to, and remains for a certain period of time during the day. Work therefore seems to be an anchor for the spatial and temporal regulation of every day life (Wilson 1998). If one is out of work for too long it is more difficult to re-establish this spatial and temporal regulation of every day life. The second reason is that work is conceived as a justifiable service or action of reciprocity to society when a person receives social assistance.

Workfare can be perceived as an instrumental means for the shaping of conduct. Dean (2000) argues that government is not only about various forms of 'conduct of conduct' and of governing through freedom but also about governing by power and violence. Dean reads workfare as micro-violence, that is a symbolic and treat of violence as it is accompanied by an ultimate sanction of withdrawal of assistance and then the means of life as well as a designation of life which is deemed 'unworthy'.

Opposite to Dean's perception of workfare as micro-violence, Torfing (1999) argues that Denmark has adopted an offensive workfare strategy, which is disarticulated from the British and American counterpart. According to Torfing, the Danish workfare strategy has, for example, put significant emphasis on activation rather than on benefit and minimum wage reductions, on improving the skills and work experience of the unemployed rather than merely increasing their mobility and job-searching efficiency and on empowerment rather than on control and punishment. One the other hand, there are limits to activation. For a large group of marginalized unemployed people it seems almost impossible to activate them in normal conditions due to the presence of severe social, psychological or health problems (Torfing 1999). Exactly for this reason the totalisation of the Danish workfare line seems to express a paradox, since unemployment has decreased considerably in Denmark during the nineties. Hansen et al. (2000) argues that the contemporary work fare line mainly has to be explained by the fear of the Social Democrats that a growing part of the Danish population will no longer support the welfare state. In this case: "Workfare policies are important for maintaining and legitimising a relatively high level of unemployment benefits, but also a necessary remedy for avoiding neo-liberal solutions for labour market regulation." (Hansen et al. 2000: 16)

Particularly when this new legislation is applied to social benefit recipients there occurs a shift from a right and objectively based judgement of whether the person is defined as unemployed or not, to a means tested judgement. Now the social benefit recipient has to show motivation and inner willingness to work (Olsen 1999). The personal judgement

of the caseworker of the recipient's willingness to work has been called 'a black hole of democracy', that is a situation where normal democratic procedures are out of work (Carstens 1998). The two often contradictory principles behind the activation legislation, to uphold common norms and values of the work ethic and to strengthen the individual client's possibilities for autonomy and (self)development, are weighted differently from one social office unit to another and from one case worker to another. The treatment of recipients therefore varies greatly depending on where and by whom the recipient is treated. In principle the client and the caseworker have to agree on a so-called 'action plan' which outlines what is to occur with regard to education, job training etc, and when it should happen. The client's personal situation and wishes have to be taken into consideration and negotiated. But in the end the caseworker can make a decision and has the power to deny further social assistance if the client refuse to co-operate and agree on the 'action plan'.

However, even the most critical studies of activation find it hard to conclude that the consequences for those activated are all but negative. Most clients are ambivalent about their activation. The overall assessment of activation from most people in activation projects is that their wellbeing has improved during the period they have been activated. This improvement in wellbeing has seldom anything to do with an improvement in their labour market chances even though activation of unemployed normally is seen as a labour market policy measure. In terms of real employment the activation measures have not led to a decrease among those who have been long-term unemployed. The integration of long-term unemployed social assistance recipients on the labour market has generally failed. But what is important for most clients is when activation establishes meaningful work and fellowship relations, and when there is an attempt to reduce or eliminate forced aspects of activation programmes (Jensen and Pless, 1999). It is crucial to meet the at risk groups on their own terms and respect their lives without making an ideal out of an at risk lifestyle. To use a normalisation principle as the guiding line in social work with these people is doomed to fail. Changes in a vulnerable person's life can happen, but a prerequisite for this is that the assistance given is in line with the practical sense or the habitus that a person has internalised.

6.3.1. Work fare in Kongens Enghave

In Kongens Enghave more than one third of the population in the age between 16 to 66 years old are outside the labour market and about half of these are unemployed social benefit recipients.

The District Council and the Local Area Improvement Project experiments in Kongens Enghave has resulted in the start-up of a number of local activation projects. The fundamental principle in the projects is that the activated people shall become important within, and be part of creating something in their local area.

The type of activation that is present in the local activation projects does not primarily function, in any shape or form, as a springboard or step towards entry to the regular labour market. Most of those people that are activated in the local projects are a long way

from being able to enter the regular labour market. Before people have progressed to the stage of being involved in a local activation project there has occurred a "creaming-off" process.[11] The unemployed who find it relatively easy to find work and/or are motivated towards education, very rarely end up in the local activation projects. Thus the local activation projects are mainly composed of people that are unemployed and have received benefits over many years, and who in reality do not have a chance in the regular labour market. Furthermore, it is a characteristic that many of these people have other social problems than just being unemployed.

In many ways *the activation projects actually function as drop-in centres rather than labour market measures*. Primarily the projects fulfil other goals than those of integrating the unemployed into the regular labour market. This type of activation is actually called "social activation". This kind of labour market has also been conceptualised as the 'third labour market'. That is a labour market for 'unemployable' long-term social assistance recipients.

Weather the activation projects have the characteristic of forced workfare or of care and help for the client depends on how the legislation is implemented locally. When most of the people interviewed in Kongens Enghave express relatively high satisfaction with the activation projects, then it is not because of the outlook to better prospects in the labour market or increased income. The main theme of stories about activation concern a sense of importance, meaningfulness and improved qualifications on both a work related and personal level.

7. Marginal spaces are also homely spaces

The previous considerations of the type of marginalized space that especially the three formal drop-in centres for the mentally ill in Kongens Enghave represent, are first and foremost a story about an intimate space. That is a space where people share everyday experiences, and where in particular, mentally ill people with a weak or non-existent network, experience their only daily social interaction. It is a space that offers an opportunity for social integration through the community, which occurs and is created there. This is a space, which in this way takes on the characteristics of a home.

The drop-in centres managers' stories mainly deal with creating and maintaining a space where there is room for those people that in many ways are excluded. This space is not characterised by the same positions and relations existing in the surrounding spaces, and where the users are allocated some other ("lower") symbolic value. A central characteristic of the drop-in centre managers' self-impression is that they are the creators and implementers of "the symbolic order of everyday life".[12] Even though there may be

[11] This creaming-off process happens everywhere (Epsen et al. 1999; Hansen 1999) and it is mainly because of the decreasing unemployment. The unemployment was between 5 to 6 percent in 2000.

[12] The concept of "the symbolic order of everyday life" was developed by Beck-Jørgensen (1994) to describe the coping strategies of long-term unemployed lone mothers.

chaos around the users and in their lives, then the drop-in centres must represent "normality" in terms of a cosy environment, proper preparation of food, neat table set-ups and serving of the meals. This creates "the symbolic order of everyday life", and the drop-in centre managers are of the opinion that this order returns users' dignity to them. "The symbolic order of everyday life" is a way of creating some type of order in an otherwise chaotic and problematic life. It can be understood as a type of symbolic glue, which influences the user in a positive manner by installing a normality and dignity in their daily life.

In a parallel fashion the users of the drop-in centres speak of them as a part of their homely sphere. For many of the users, their own (physical) home is associated with loneliness, boredom and for many of the mentally ill their home is actually a harbouring place for fear and obsessive-compulsive thoughts, whilst the drop-in centre is associated with homeliness in the shape of food, care and social contact. For some their accommodation ("the home") is just a place to be, whilst the drop-in centre is the place where one can feel at home. The drop-in centre is the place where there is social contact, where one can eat a hot meal with others and the place where the social aspects of life can develop.

The drop-in centre must therefore been seen as a part of the users' home. If the home is only understood or defined as a physical space to be one that protects against wind and weather then this definition ignores peoples' need for social contact and communication. A physical space does not protect against loneliness. The ability of physical space to function in an integrating fashion (to create a meaningful universe and relationships of belonging) assumes that a social functionality can be created in that space. If the home for a person is associated with isolation and a fearful existence, the home represents a problematic place to be. When the drop-in centres create this sociality and fear-reducing environment, then they cannot be viewed in isolation from the person place of residence. Certainly it is the place of residence that gives the person an official identity in society. An address is required for the official register and associated right to a Medicare card, ability to open a bank account etc. Without these links to the different societal systems you are almost a person of non-existence in today's society (Beck 1997). But if it is the drop-in centre that provides a person with their own identity, then the drop-in centre is a part of the home; that is, the place where one feels at home.

8. Marginal places, communities and identities in Kongens Enghave

A sense of place is created by the socialisation of space. Spaces are never just a physical condition, but are to a large degree made up of the ways that people place themselves socially. This social placement in a space brings with it borders and distinctions around that which is associated or not associated with the space. Borders and distinctions that at first appear as "natural" and "self explanatory", are the result of complicated negotiations around the rights to the space. Those people that move in for the short or long term inhabit the public space. Public spaces convert to private spaces, and are thus never neutral zones, but actually spaces that always change importance, interpretation and

relevance in relation to those people that occupy them (Goffman 1971). The social construction of meaning in relation to places is created, for example, through different institutions, social relations and discourses (Harvey 1996). In this sense, places are not stable entities but are created and re-created by historically processes. Places represent values; perceptions and practices, which constitute communities.

Structures in the social space become an expression in a number of ways in the form of spatial contradictions, where the occupied or acquired space functions as a form of apparent symbolisation of the social space. When society is hierarchical (e.g. among those that work and do not work, among those that are "beer drinkers" and those that are not beer drinkers, between the mentally ill and drug addicts etc.) then the physical space also becomes hierarchical. Certain types of differences that have developed through a longer historical process will often appear as natural social and spatial differences. The way for example, that the sexes take up and are placed in the social and physical space, appears in many ways as unproblematic in narratives about Kongens Enghave and the drop-in centres.[13] It is thus assumed that there are only a few women among the beer drinkers and that they are different to other women.

Identity is thus tied up with both space and territory. The identity is, among other things, about identifying oneself with particular places, for example by the fact that distinctions are created between other places-to-be and those people that occupy these other places-to-be. Places where the marginalized live and develop their identity can be seen as both problem areas and as pockets of resistance. However, they are also sites of ordering (Hetherington 1997). The relationship between marginal places and their inhabitants and other places and their inhabitants are not only or even mainly one of conflictual relations but also one of ordering relations. The mere existence of marginal places might actually produce a kind of ordering of social relationships in a community with heterogeneous groups and people. Such places can be symbolised by another set of values and impressions than those that are the norm in society, and these places can present a fulcrum for their identity and the way in which they want to identified. Such places can take on a central role for reproduction of marginal or outsider identities (Shields 1991, Hetherington 1998). These places can create possibilities for individuals and groups being able to exist and interact in a different way and that they eventually can constitute new identities and narratives among the individuals that congregate in the places. These indeterminable places and the practices that constitute these special places-to-be by various types of alternative activities have been described by a number of different authors. Foucault (1986) calls them "heterotopia", Turner (1974) calls them "liminal space", and Lefebvre (1991) calls them 'representational spaces'. Concepts such as 'marginal space' (Shields 1991, Cresswell 1996) or 'paradoxical space' (Rose 1993) have also been used to describe such places.

However, who are outsiders, and who are insiders, is dependent on the position of the observer. Becker (1963) points out that for people who are branded as outsiders by

[13] For a more detailed analyses of gender constructions and dichotomies in relation to space refer for example to Rose (1993) and Massey (1994).

other, the orientation can be completely reversed. Perhaps the outsider does not accept those rules and norms from which the definition/construction of "outsider" is defined. As well he/she will not accept that those people that define him/her as an outsider has the competence or a legitimate right to carry out this outsider labelling. For the one who breaks the rules, these "others", those that judge and carry out the labelling, can be perceived as outsiders themselves. He/she perceives himself as an insider in the group, which has the same identity and way of functioning as him/herself. Although the insider and the outsider view of such heterotopic or marginal places may be in total opposition to each other they none the less create an ordering of spatial and social relations. Social relations may without such a spatial ordering be much more conflictual and destructive for the community. But the paradox around these marginal places is that they serve as identity creating, and at the same time the community sees them as marginal places. Marginal places are those that function as a symbolic centre for outsider groups or groups that are, or consider themselves to be on the periphery of society. These individuals and groups, that can become or be experienced as the "others" or the "strangers" and "foreigners" by the surrounding community, create identities in such places, and eventually some resistance to the 'conduct of conduct' imposed on them by the rest of the community or the society at large. These places can hold many different types of identities and practices. In connection with this, it is about places where people can find a sanctuary, retire to, or be referred to. A place where it is only those that are members of the "tribe", that want to or are able to come. Whether it is about one type place or the other, then they are the centres for the development of meaning and identity. The social construction of the space brings with it the fact that it can be seen from a number of different visual angles and interpretations, and with these, various symbolic interpretations that various individuals and groups in society make about the space (Jay 1992, Zukin 1992). This brings with it the fact that specific spaces are seen as particularly important by particular groups, and as such act as catalysts for socially constructed communities.

9. In Defence of the small ghetto

The ghetto is often used as a derogatory term – as something that should not be found in our city or as a symbol of the dangerous and evil in city life. However, in certain instances the ghetto does fulfil very positive functions for its inhabitants (Christie 1992). There is a need for differential spaces so that the right to be different is recognised (Lefebvre 1991). In my defence of the ghetto I am not arguing for concentration and segregation of immigrants, refugees and socially excluded people in certain areas and housing estates in the city. However, in particular, these groups are often not rooted in resource-strong networks with easy access to economic, social, cultural and political capital. To spread these people all over the city and in housing estates to avoid segregation is basically a way of denying them a place of their own; a place where they can share common narratives, community feelings and identities. Even with the best intentions strong anti-segregation policies can create processes where the socially excluded are further marginalized and end up being isolated in their own restricted physical and social space.

The city dweller of today – and especially those who belong to the most mobile part of the working population – live a rather individualised life. Many studies have shown that they do not necessarily wish or need intimate social relations with their neighbours or the community. Many want to live an anonymous life among strangers (Pløgger 1999). They are based in networks of which only a few are local (refer also to Bauman 1998, Castells 1997). However, those strangers that they want to live among should be their likes and not potential dangerous and deviant strangers.

Those who have a real need for community building and identity is first and foremost the non-mobile: elderly people, handicapped people, and others who are much more territorially fixed. But the kind of community they are most strongly oriented towards is the small ghetto. In this sense it is perhaps difficult to maintain the idea of a joint local community which secures a strong social integration for all its members. On the other hand, there is also an obvious danger in placing to much emphasis on difference, because it may lead to a counterproductive social fragmentation and to tribalism. Acknowledging differences and differential space should not lead to mechanisms and processes of closure, where certain tribes are denied access to common goods, that is common resources, decision making and narratives. In to days society there may no longer be an overriding model of social integration, but to put to much emphasis on tribalism may create hostility and lack of social cohesion. Instead of having mutual recognised differential spaces in a local community, the lines between differential spaces could become confrontational spaces.

10. Opening and Closing Marginal Places

Compared to most other local areas there are relatively many different types of drop-in centres in Kongens Enghave. This is mainly because there are many people who live on the edge and many types of marginal groups in the district. However, another significant explanation is that Kongens Enghave has historically developed great social capacity and tolerance for different and slightly strange existences. These have been part of the area's historical development, and since the 1920's, the local district has been populated by a mixture of lower rung white collar workers, the better-off working class, unskilled workers, casual workers, the unemployed and the marginalized. In contrast to other more prestigious and financially better-off districts in Copenhagen and suburbs, where the inhabitants often fought vigorously and successfully against the establishment of treatment centres and drop-in centres for drug addicts, the mentally ill, young offenders etc, the inhabitants of Kongens Enghave have to a large degree accepted that the deviant groups constitute a proportion of the district's population. This was evidently manifested in 2000 when the City Council of Copenhagen during the negotiations of the 2001 budget decided to close down the drop-in centre 'Amadeus' (for mentally ill people). Due to massive protests from the population of Kongens Enghave the City Council finally decided not to close down 'Amadeus'.

The prerequisite for being able to practice "the politics of differences" and thus create the potential for the co-existence of different ways of life in the local physical and social space, it is my hypothesis that there are in existence a wide variety of drop-in centres in the area. This provides the opportunity for choosing or not choosing various types of communities. Drop-in centres modus operandi is, however, also about surveillance and control. But it is not an institutionalised kind of discipline as it works as a part of every day practices (Deleuze 1995). Drop-in centres work as 'conduct of conduct' and as mediators between marginal people and the local community. Drop-in centres are a relatively cheap way of massaging the field between inclusion and exclusion such that the dividing line between the two is made less obvious. If the dividing line between inclusion an exclusion becomes insurmountable for certain individuals, then it is likely that their physical and social vulnerability will escalate, and/or that conflicts between various individuals and groups in the social and physical also escalate.

However, under tight economic conditions the political and administrative system's considerations around opening and closing of drop-in centres are often made based on tight cost-benefit considerations, that rarely have anything to do with the quality of life for the most disadvantaged groups. Users of marginal places are not a group with a lot of clout. First, it is difficult to get them to participate in a formal democratic framework. This is partly because they see informal and formal democracy as two very different things, in respect to both behaviour and rules of the game, and in relation to whom they are accountable to. Second, many from the disadvantaged groups form an experienced-based impression, that the formal political and administrative system is always out to "suck in" people like them, or that essentially the system is not interested in them as citizens. In this way they experience the formal political and administrative system as one which only sees them as people with social problems, that thus represent a problem for the (local) community. They are not used to be seen as people with resources that are able to make positive contributions to the development of the local community. Whether this impression of attitudes and practices in the formal political and administrative system in reality is right or wrong, then such impressions tend to act as self-fulfilling prophecies.

There are no indications that the disadvantaged groups are brought in or active in either the District Council Experiment or in the Local Area Improvement Projects in Kongens Enghave. Rather, they comprise those discourses and concrete initiatives that are occurring in relation to them. But when the disadvantaged groups do not represent themselves, who does? And which needs and interests of these people is it possible to pinpoint – both collectively and individually? Drop-in centres must most likely today be seen as the pivotal point that exist for a discourse about representation of the viewpoints and interests of the disadvantaged. The drop-in centre managers are in this situation central links for communication, in that they internally represent the drop-in centres to the users, and externally to the professional and political decision-makers. Partly they represent the users' point of view to the outside in the sense that they are capable and willing to transport the users' "needs" out into the public political environment and promote their points of view on to the political decision makers. On the whole they promote and represent the users' points of view in the general political process around

the District Council and the Local Area Improvement Project. Those lines of communication (including networks), that exist between the drop-in centres' managers and the District Council and the Local Area Improvement Project, are thus crucial for the promotion of the interests of the disadvantaged groups.

The drop-in centres thus serve another significant role over and above creating places-to-be for marginal people, in that they can be seen as prerequisites for everyone's participation in democracy. It is for example, at the drop-in centres that the disadvantaged groups collectively pool their experiences and create narratives about themselves and their being-in-places in the area. The formulation of needs, interests and experiences contribute to the strengthening of the individual as well as the group. But it also makes possible – for example through the drop-in centres' managers representation – that these needs, interests and experiences can be brought into the formal democratic system and perhaps influence the political process and those decisions that are made there. Democracy at the lowest levels can thus be that some people legitimately represent those that find it difficult to act in formal political situations, and on the whole those that find it difficult to represent themselves; especially mentally ill people.

11. Conclusion

The case study of Kongens Enghave has shown that the spatialized and culturalized Danish social policy has, among other things, contributed to facilitate the creation of communities for marginal people. These small ghetto's or communities of marginal people may well be a last resort of making sense of the world or of socialising. Rather paradoxically this politics of marginal places may facilitate rather than counter act 'marginal cultures'. Therefore there seems to be a tension or ambivalence built into this new urban governance regime. On the one hand, the overall governmental policy is aiming at the reintegration of marginal people into the normal labour market and other normalizing social institutions. Everybody is to be self-supportive and self-conductive. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness - at least at the local governmental level- of the impossibility of normalising all people. Mentally ill people, drug addicts, alcoholics and socially disabled people are not easily put into the normal chaos of the labour market, the family and social networks. My reading of the Danish politics of marginal spaces is therefore that it is an attempt to revitalise deprived urban areas by the construction of differential spaces. It is a way of accommodating socially excluded people in these urban renewal projects so that they are not further marginalized by an otherwise revitalised community development.

Consequently, I have mainly analysed and argued for drop-in centres as potentially identity creating and social integrational places. However, it is also very likely that drop-in centres becomes a relatively cheap way of containing, entertaining and conducting marginal people in the local public space instead of developing more comprehensive and coherent programmes to combat social exclusion and to create social integration. Then, the crucial question is: When do drop-in centres function as empowerment facilitating spaces and when do they create disempowerment?

This question is especially relevant where the local area as a whole is underprivileged in relation to the surrounding local areas or the standard of the region or nation or even the greater (European) community. In the context of Copenhagen and the Danish national context, Kongens Enghave is indeed an underprivileged local area. Therefore, local anti-poverty and anti-exclusion programmes can not be the only way of responding to local social exclusion and marginalized people. There has to be a social and financial responsibility from regional, national or even European authorities in relation to the solving of the structural problems of the area as well as helping those people in the area who are marginalized. A one-sided strategy of strengthening community cohesion in disadvantaged neighbourhoods may have the effect of reinforcing their economic, social and cultural distance and exclusion from other and possibly more favourable opportunities within the larger urban region. To strengthening a community's economic and social capital and other forms of capital there seems to be a need to be looking both inside and outside the neighbourhood or local community. Spatialized and culturalized social policy can only be seen as encompassing and enabling if it is combined with a politics of redistribution.

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Who cares about and for marginal people?

BY

Jørgen Elm Larsen

Who cares about and for marginal people?

1. Introduction

The increasing pressure for providing care time and caring facilities particularly for children and the elderly have in recent years been highlighted in the debate on the future of welfare arrangements in the European countries. However, in this debate on the so-called caring deficit some groups in need of care tend to be neglected. There are certain groups who are lacking family and close social network relations, particularly among the groups consisting of mentally ill people, drug addicts and alcoholics. Most of these people are on long-term or permanent public support. They are often in severe need of caring relations, but who cares about and for them? In fact, often very few care about and for them – and that goes for the public in general as well as for public social policy institutions. There seems to be a severe caring deficit in relation to these groups. Especially in a situation where 'care' is or will become a scarce resource, these marginal people are in a hard competition for caring resources. Municipalities and local communities with high concentrations of marginal and elderly people, and with financial problems are especially exposed to the caring deficit.

The starting point of the paper is an examination of the diagnosis of the caring deficit and of some of the proposed solutions to it. It is suggested that an overriding governmental strategy responding to the crisis of welfare management, is that of governing through community. Local communities are to be able to be self-supporting and to take care of its members. Kongens Enghave, a deprived local city district in Copenhagen is used as a case to illustrate how care for and conduct of marginal people are brought about via different kinds of drop-in centres.[1] In this context, it is illustrated how social workers at the local Social Security Office perceive and handle marginal people. Seen from the point of view of the Social Security Office, marginal men are particularly difficult or impossible to help by traditional social policy means. The crisis of the normalisation principle in social work has called for other governance strategies. The challenge posed to the new urban governance in the 1990's has been to fuse housing and social policy in such a way that it constructs a sense of meaning and identity for marginal people as well as for the local community as a whole. This has been done by socially constructing different kinds of communities for different kinds of people or (sub) cultures within the local community. The caring deficit in relation to marginal people is therefore partly to be solved by the politics of marginal space, which aims at constructing different spaces as caring communities, and which are able to facilitate meaning and

[1] The empirical material referred to in this paper is based on interview with employees and clients at the local Social Security Office and with employees at and users of "drop-in centres" ("væresteder") for mentally ill, drug addicts, alcholics and other marginal or lonely people in Kongens Enghave. The local area study of Kongens Enghave is part of the research programme "Gender, Empowerment and Politics" which is financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council 1996-2001.

identity building. The concept of the politics of marginal space is developed to point out that marginal communities can be seen both as spaces of government and of care. Finally, and in conclusion, it is discussed whether the politics of marginal space can be perceived as an adequate solution to demands for a caring citizenship.

2. The diagnosis of the 'caring deficit'

Up until the 1990's most welfare debate and welfare research focused on cash benefit programmes, and the debate on the crisis of the welfare state was mainly concerned with the question of how to resolve the problem of financing cash benefits.

However, rapid and comprehensive changes in demographic patterns, in women's labour market participation and in family structures pose challenges to the existing caring arrangements for those who can not care for themselves: children, frail elderly people and psychically and socially handicapped or sick people. These developments have all contributed to the gab between resources and demand for care. This gab has been termed the 'caring deficit' (Hochschild 1995, Boje and Leira 2000).

The EU countries are all – to a higher or lesser degree – facing these increasing demands for care and care services. Women's increasing labour market participation is leaving a care deficit in the family; especially in relation to children and frail elderly relatives. Until recently the caring problem of dual-earner families was primarily seen as a problem of childcare (Hoskins 1993). But in the 1990's the issue of caring for the frail elderly came to the forefront of the social policy debate. The ageing of the population is severely expanding the demands for care at the same time as the family's ability to provide care is decreasing and as there are fewer people of working age to pay and provide for care. Within the European Union people over 60 years of age now make up more than 20 per cent of the population and the largest increase is in the age bracket above 80 years (Fargion 2000). This group, of course, requires more health and care services since it is among these that the largest proportion of frail elderly is found. More and more dual-earner families are confronted with the problem of caring for frail elderly family members.

However, the list of people affected by the caring deficit does not stop here. There are groups in a special need of care: handicapped people, chronically sick and mentally ill people. Some of these have been cared for in institutions, at least for periods of their lives. Others have been cared for by the family (read women) at home. The combined effect of women's increasing labour market participation and the de-centralisation of treatment and care to the community level has also produced a caring deficit in relation to these groups.

Finally, at the bottom of the list of who deserves and are entitled to care, we find different groups of marginalized people: the homeless, drug addicts and alcoholics. While the care of children and frail elderly is considered a problem to which there has to be found solutions, there is more uncertainty with regards to the problem of caring for marginalized people.

3. Mission impossible?

There is no simple solution to the caring deficit. The most commonly proposed solutions to the caring deficit mainly follow two directions: re-familiarisation or de-familiarisation. Both of these solutions have been thought of within the national borders. A third and perhaps the most obvious solution on the road to de-familiarisation is to open up for immigration of young people from poor countries outside the EU (Hansen and Larsen 1993). However, this solution collides with several political and cultural barriers inside the EU countries (Abrahamson 2001). One the other hand, particularly in the southern European countries, many illegal immigrant women is employed as cheap labour in dual-earner households (Saraceno 2000).

Re-familiarisation

Re-familiarisation does not seem to be a viable solution to uphold or even extract extra caring facilities for the family. Firstly, today it is only possible for a minority of families to depend on one income. In most EU countries, the male breadwinner model is breaking down. Dual-earner households are not only the norm in the Nordic countries, but are also becoming the norm in the other EU countries. Even if it is, or was possible for women to stay at home and take care of children and elderly relatives, fewer and fewer women wish to do so – at least for a longer period of time. Nordenmark (1997) has, for example shown that young Swedish women are even more orientated towards the labour marked than young Swedish men, because it is very important for them to be self supporting and independent of a male breadwinner. Thirdly, due to the high geographically mobility on the labour market many, elderly do not always have close relatives living near by to care for them. Finally, due to the low fertility rates in Europe, the demand for labour will be high in the future and more and more women are expected to participate on the labour market. At the same time there will be no grandparents to look after grandchildren since there will be a pressure to keep people on the labour market until they reach the age of 65 or even 70. Families still uphold a great deal of caring duties, but to the extent that the family should be obliged to take on further caring tasks, then the resources for these must mainly be provided by men. However, experiences with different kinds of leave arrangement for reconciling work and family life are contradictory. At least in Denmark, among other things, it is because of the nature of leave arrangements that only few fathers took leave to care for their small children (Olsen 2000).

Whilst the EU attempts to be proactive with regards to framework agreements about parental leave and a more balanced participation of women and men in work and family life (EU-kommissionen/Videnscenter for Ligestilling 2001), the Danish model for parental leave has been eroded at the same time as it has not been revised in such a way as to attract more fathers. This is partly because Danish parental leave arrangements were initially viewed more as a labour market arrangement rather than as a family policy arrangement. With a decrease in unemployment and fewer people in the labour market, the need for labour is again more in focus than a consideration of whether families can achieve a better balance between their family life and working life.

De-familiarisation

If re-familiarisation is not a possible solution to the increasing demands for care, is de-familiarisation then the solution to the caring deficit? Extra family care, however is not an unconditional universal citizenship right, since citizenship is more a process than a right (Turner 1990, Proccaci 1998). Who pays for, who delivers and who receives care, varies greatly among welfare states (Antonen and Sipilä 1996). The rights of citizenship have been constructed on the grounds of different national economic, political and cultural conditions. As much as citizenship is about rights, it is also about governance. Since citizenship is a social construction grounded in specific circumstances citizenship is always a political matter. Citizenship is a governmental way of shaping the conduct of citizens as much as it is about granting citizens rights. Within the field of care, different national maternity leave arrangements, for example, intend to shape the conduct of mothers and families in different ways. In France extended maternity leave was provided on the basis of familial and pronatalist grounds where as in the Nordic countries similar arrangements were related to labour market conditions. In the Netherlands such leave arrangements were not introduced before the 1990's, since women were simply defined as mothers, wives and housekeepers (Knijn and Kremer 1997). Also the claim for care as a citizenship right are perceived differently by feminist scholars depending not in the least on the context in which they live and write (see for example Knijn 1994 and Lister 1997).

In the Nordic countries, the state has to a relatively high degree, taken on the responsibility for the needs for extra-family care, but in most EU countries – including the Nordic countries – the obligations of the family are altered and new patterns of paying for and delivering care are under way (Rostgaard and Friedberg 1998).[2] In one sense, however, re-familiarisation has been a solution to the caring deficit in that families, to a

[2] The Nordic countries are, however, not especially hard hit by the 'caring deficit' since these countries have more or less gone through the transition from the male-breadwinner model to the dual-breadwinner model and since the fertility rates in the Nordic countries are among the highest in EU. Finally, but not least the public infrastructure to care for children and the elderly are comprehensive due to the early transition from the male-breadwinner model to the dual-breadwinner model and due to the emphasis in the Nordic Model on public provision of social and caring services and of cash benefits.

much higher degree than before, are paying for care. Caring business is today big business in several EU countries. The marketization of care unavoidably leads to a polarisation between those who can afford to and those who can not afford to buy care. As far as the public primarily provides poor people with caring services these services will – as Titmuss formulated it long ago – tend to be poor services.

Marginalized people and care

Looking at the caring deficit from the perspective of marginal people, they seem to be left in a world of their own, and are facing caring deficits both in relation to the family, the state and the marketplace. Most marginal people only have loose or no contact at all to their family and can therefore not expect, and usually do not receive care from their family. Caring facilities provided by the state or at the municipality level for marginal people are often fragmented and of poor quality. Marginal people belong to the less deserving citizens or are defined by public institutions as difficult to reach with traditional social policy means. Finally, buying care services at the market is out of the question for marginal people. Are there any solutions to this kind of exclusion and lack of social integration? Paradoxically, in the midst of the increasing processes of individualisation and marketization of social security and care there has been a new emphasis on the community. The contemporary processes of individualisation are circumscribed by a new communitarian ethic.

4. Caring communities

Over and beyond the issue of de-familiarisation versus re-familiarisation, there seems to be a governmentality issue of relocating obligations and responsibilities to the community level. When referring to community care in the political debate there is a clear notion of voluntary and charitable work, of self-organised care and of unpaid services – that is the so-called 'third sector'.

In the Danish political debate about the future of social policy state interventions and state financing of social programmes, intervention is still seen as being crucial for the welfare of citizens, but in Denmark there is also an increasing emphasis on the role of communities and the 'third sector'. This is made clear by the two following statements by the former Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs Karen Jespersen reflecting – while she was still Minister of Social Affairs - upon the 'social' challenges faced by the Danish society:

"With both men and women in the workforce, there are fewer resources for caring work. (...) Thus there is a need for reviving civil society and individual's responsibility for each other as well as participating in helping each other." (Jespersen 1997; cited from Villadsen et al., 1998)

"Today it is more about improving internal rather than external well-being. It concerns the fact that many people are lonely and are in need of self-esteem and social networks, they simply do not have a sense of belonging. It concerns a poverty problem which the government on it's own will not be able to deal with. Individual citizens must, to a much greater degree, take responsibility for others at work, in residential areas, within the family, in organisations etc. Particularly, it is about people being able to take responsibility for them selves if we are to move away from the fact that many people are being taken care of via public funding. This does not mean that government participation should decrease, but that it needs to change. The government should strengthen individual citizen's professional, social and personal expectations with the goal of having them being self-sufficient and become active participants in society's community. Thus we need to have individuals and their opportunities as a central political focal points. However, people only become strong and able to help themselves if they are part of strong communities, in which they take co-responsibility." (Jespersen 2000)

When I emphasise these two statements by the former Danish minister of Social Affairs, then it is not only because they express a general tendency in Danish social policy thought and practice, but that this is also happening in other European countries. At the EU level, great emphasis is being placed on community action programmes, partnership models, and welfare mix that are being promoted as for example "good practice" within the social policy arena. That is co-operation and a division of labour between private, public and volunteer actors and organisations regarding the production and delivery of welfare services.

Government through community

The old welfare state regimes are everywhere undergoing transformations and there is a move from a "welfare society" to an "active society" (Walters 1997) and with this a move from "citizenship rights" to "active citizenship". The implication here is of "... a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own future well-being and upon their own obligation to take active steps to secure this" (Rose: 1996: 327-28). This new governmental way is especially relevant to the English-speaking world, but the same tendencies are present in a number of Nordic countries (Rose 1999). Rose terms this new governmental way as *government through community*. Community has become a spatialization of government. It is characterised by a governing "... through regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous actors in context of their particular commitments to families and communities" (Rose 1996: 328). Urban renewal programmes, for example, try to re-invent and reconstruct certain inner-city areas as "communities" by mobilising local groups and actors in these community construction projects. In these community construction processes marginal people are to be "empowered" by experts teaching, coaching and persuading them to conduct themselves in relation to some particular norms and to be able to achieve rational self-management.

The active intervention and regulation by the state of the social spaces has been a prominent characteristic of the social policy and urban and housing policy discourse and activity in Denmark in the 1990's. The core idea of the new urban governance in Denmark in the 1990s has been that the local communities should be self-supporting and self-regulating (By- og Boligministeriet 1999/The Ministry of City and Housing). Every district of the city has to be a city within the city, with its own governance structure, enterprise structure, places of employment, housing estates, cultural and sporting facilities etc. However, to be able to address these needs it has been vital to reconstruct the local social infrastructure and social networks. In essence, the new urban governance has been directed towards the recreation of "gemeinschaft" and community feeling and identity.[3] The social and cultural dimension of city planning has therefore come to the fore in the new urban governance regime (Pløgger 1999). Rose has argued that the most distinctive feature of this new governing is that "It is a moral field binding persons into durable relations. It is a space of *emotional relationships* through which *individual identities* are constructed through their bonds to *micro-cultures* of values and meanings." (Rose 1999: 172) There is a growing anxiety about communities' loss of social coherence, power to produce social integration and their lack of informal surveillance and informal control processes (Pløgger 2000). When it is no longer possible to maintain or create homogeneous communities, the existence or fabrication of devices and technologies to help building different spaces of social integration is vital for the overall well being of the community. There have to be secure and friendly public spaces, which can offer a sense of meaning and identity, a sense of belonging to place and community. The new urban governance in Denmark has adopted such a spatialized cultural approach in its planning rhetoric. Contemporary Danish urban communities are not stable in the sense that there is high mobility in and out of places and housing areas and lacking socio-cultural homogeneity. Cultural constructivism is therefore increasingly by governmental institutions and actors, seen as a way of improving the quality of peoples everyday life, especially in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of marginal people.

There are, however, several obstacles for a communitarian model of care for marginal people. One obstacle is that mainstream community life tends to exclude those who have different or deviant life styles. The call for an ethic of care (for example Tronto 1993, Bussemaker 1998) has a strong resonance in the idea of caring communities. However, in the real world this ethic of care does not include marginal people. Whenever, for example 'homes' for marginal people are to be established in a local community or neighbourhood these initiatives are usually meet with massive protest from the inhabitants: Not in my back yard. Another obstacle, which is closely related to the first mentioned, is that marginal people are not neatly spread out in space. Marginal people are increasingly concentrated in certain city districts and housing estates. Communities with a high concentration of marginal people have the biggest need for caring resources

[3] The new urban governance rethoric certainly resemble the communitarian idea (see for example Etzioni (1995). For a critique of the communitarian idea and especially in relation to city life see for example Young (1990).

and they are themselves less likely to be able to mobilise these resources. These local communities are themselves in a process of becoming marginal communities, deprived communities or troubled housing estates.

5. Marginal people in the deprived local community Kongens Enghave

By Danish standards, Kongens Enghave is considered to be an extremely disadvantaged area. This city district in Copenhagen has the highest percentage of unemployment in Denmark and the average income is very low. One third of the population between 16 to 66 years of age is outside the labour market and most of these receive long-term or permanent public support. Furthermore, more than 20 percent of the population is above 65 years of age. The district is often seen as and described by those outside of it, but also by its own inhabitants as being socially disadvantaged. At the same time, however, Kongens Enghave represents a lively civil society with many active organisations as well many formal and informal social activities. Kongens Enghave can more precisely be understood as a traditional local working class community within a post-traditional and post-industrial metropolis. Typically many of the local inhabitants that have lived there all or most of their lives see many good qualities associated with it and want to stay living there (Bille and Lund 1979, Gut 2000). This is not least due to the fact that most people still perceive Kongens Enghave's public spaces as friendly and communicative. But as in many other deprived districts of European cities, Kongens Enghave is experiencing a 'crisis of reproduction' of the working class and its culture (Fowler 1996) and this especially apply to unskilled working class men (Andersen and Larsen 1998).

Risk communities and social work

The crisis of the reproduction of unskilled male worker's life world is both a structural and a personal one. The lack of unskilled wage work and many years on public support often combined with the splitting up of families and living through identity crises have produced risky and deviant life styles among certain marginal men. In the public discourse these risky life styles are highlighted as risk communities. Among these risk communities are homeless people, drug addicts and alcoholics. Some of these people have more or less since their childhood – not least due to neglect – been in precarious conditions and have never entered into "normal" living arrangements. These risk communities are often also highlighted as those that are the most difficult to reach by public social policy. In Denmark, the caring deficit in local communities with a high concentration of marginal people living in risk communities such as Kongens Enghave is increasingly dealt with by a closer co-operation between public and volunteer organisations.

Public social work is subject to political determined working parameters and has in many ways very different working conditions compared to voluntary social work. However, often the two are seen as complimentary – each with its own issues and ways of dealing with them. It is especially in social work with certain marginalized groups, such as the homeless and mentally ill, that voluntary social work is perceived as much more effective for establishing contact and providing humane care compared to that offered by public social arrangements. At least this is way that the relationship between public and voluntary social work is primarily viewed from the political perspective (refer to Socialministeriet/The Ministry of Social Affairs 1997 and 1998). However, this apparent complementary relationship between public and voluntary social work is not only of a symbiotic nature, but also takes on contrary aspects when it concerns integration of certain groups of marginalized people. The social life of many marginalized people in Kongens Enghave is closely associated with those drop-in centres that are run by volunteer organisations as well as other meeting places for marginalized people in the district. Their social integration is here particularly dependent on their degree of marginalization and lack of self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the basis for their maintenance is dependent on their role as client at the local Social Security Office, and the primary objective of public social work is to create a normalised integration such that marginalized people can provide for their own living. This is especially manifested in the activation policy. Thus the success of public social work is also dependent on whether marginalized people can be moved out of those marginalized communities that they move within and feel particularly part of. With regard to this task the staff at the local Social Security Office feel as if they continually run into a brick wall. This is because that in Kongens Enghave there is a particular group of men who are very difficult to separate from the marginalized communities they belong to. These men are described as "heavy cases" by the social workers, and are seen as being more or less outside the reach of regular social work practices. In Kongens Enghave's Social Security Office, the label "heavy cases" is applied to those clients that seem remote from the social workers perception of normality, and who are seen to be very difficult to do anything with. The "heavy cases" are almost all men, and are characterised as "poor fellows" that have lost their jobs and families, and most are heavy drinkers or have other drug dependencies. Simultaneously, the social workers feel that they do not have the methods, tools or social technologies, which is required to help or influence these men to change the way they live their lives.[4]

The social workers establish a certain "regime of truth" and thus a particular self-perception within the social security office, which in turn determines the internal systemic relationships and the systems relationship to the external world. In addition a "regime of practice" (Foucault 1991) develops which simultaneously excludes both the images of reality of the "heavy men" and establishes them as deviants. At the same time the exclusion also becomes a condition for inclusion in the social security system. By defining some clients as "heavy cases", they are allocated to a special area, to the

[4] One third of the male clients at Kongens Enghaves Social Security Office are classified as former or active alcohol abusers (Bruhn 2001).

"heavy cases division" as it is called internally at the Social Security Office in Kongens Enghave, and they are included in a particular discourse about what the system can do with them in relation to, for example, how they can most appropriately be activated. With the latest changes in Danish activation policies since 1998, virtually all registered unemployed people of 18 to 60 years of age have to engage in an activation programme, irrespective of their age and other social problems. Thus activation will eventually become a reality at some point or other, for the large and mixed group of marginalized people in Kongens Enghave, irrespective of the type and severity of the social problems they have. The only exceptions being early age pensioners and clinically diagnosed mentally ill people. Everybody must therefore be self-sufficient, self-directed and take joint responsibility for their own life and for others in the community. On the other hand, there is an increased awareness, not least among certain local institutions and participants, of the difficulties involved in the attempted normalisation of all people. The mentally ill, drug addicts, alcoholics and the socially handicapped can not in the short term be easily and cost effectively – if at all – socialised and included in the normal labour market, family or social networks.

6. The marginalized man

Marginalized men are an extreme case of 'de-familiarisation'. Most of these men are lacking close family and social network relationships. If they have children, it is most likely that all contact with these children has ceased to exist. In a sense these men are totally on their own.

However, rarely do "heavy men" attract much attention or attempts at understanding by social workers or social researchers. The dominant masculinity (Connell 1987; Bourdieu 1999) is the means by which these male failures are measured – by both men and women. These men belong to a "shamed group" (Goffman 1963). As masculine failures they do not attract much attention or understanding. They are what they are - at best failures, at worst a threat or burden to the (local) community.

For those men at the bottom of society, there are limited opportunities for establishing an identity that promotes self-confidence. To escape this stigmatisation of failure, some try to build up another type of identity that can provide self-worth and a sense of belonging. Nonn (1995) is of the opinion that it is only when men reach the bottom of society – when the dominant picture of masculinity breaks down and no longer can be maintained – that they then are able to move upwards again.
By this, another masculinity becomes possible – one which is more flexible and tolerant towards individual differences. This alternative masculinity incorporates mutual honesty, care, respect and dependence among the men at the bottom of society. In their own way, these men become creative in their attempts at survival. This redefinition of masculinity evolves out of a need to co-exist under difficult conditions, but it also creates a foundation for a common feeling of resistance, power and unity.

It is my impression that this alternative masculinity and its possible potentials remain hidden for both men and women that are influenced by the dominant male stereotype ideal. Men at the bottom of society can be, and are viewed totally as, losers (Carlsen and Larsen 1993; Andersen and Larsen 1999). However, Goffman points out that the deviant, stigmatised person, and the normal person, are perspectives rather than concrete people – in that nearly all individuals at least in certain situations and times in their lives can appear as both a normal and stigmatised individual (Goffman 1963). However, the focus by the Social Security Office on abnormalities and not on actual or potential resources, tends to maintain "heavy men" in their deviant and stigmatised position. The "heavy men" thus become, on the one hand, a symbol of failure for the type of social work that aims towards normalisation. And on the other hand, the stigmatisation of these men contributes to the creation of relationships and distinctions between different client groups, for example, between those that can be helped and those that can not be helped, or between those who deserve assistance – who people are willing to spend time and effort with – and those who are not deserving and on whom one should not spend too much time or effort.

Within the whole social policy system, a systematic "creaming off " process is taking place. Here those that are suitable for treatment are sorted from those deemed not to be suitable. At the same time the development of clear hierarchies occurs, in relation to which groups who are seen as contributing or not contributing to their own fate. The mentally ill are generally not seen as contributing to their own fate and thus are entitled to a higher level of priority in relation to treatment and services, whereas alcoholics and especially drug addicts are placed fairly low down in the hierarchy.

For example, if we take a closer look at alcoholics, we find that fewer men among these have children compared with the male population as a whole and among those who have children many are totally out of contact with their children. These are typically also those who are long-term unemployed and/or homeless. There clearly exists a dichotomy in the treatment of socially excluded alcoholics and alcoholics who are considered to be in a situation where they can be "saved". Alcoholics with work and/or families are much more likely to receive costly treatment than alcoholics without work and family. Järvinen (1998) points out that alcohol ambulatories, treatment homes and psychiatric wards have classifications that distinguish between those who are considered treatable and those who are not. The non-treatable are those who do not show any will to be cured. These are also as in the local Social Security Office in Kongens Enghave classified as 'heavy cases' or "the bad company". Combined with the budgetary cut in the public treatment system a new moralising perspective on alcoholism has developed. Severe alcoholics are seen as having lost their self-control. These alcoholics are typically only offered antabus-treatment while those who are considered saveable and able to socially integrate are offered comprehensive and often long-term treatment (Järvinen 1998). What happens is a further marginalization of the "heavy cases" among the alcoholics. They are left to cheap public treatment, to be cared for by voluntary organisations or to be left to care for them selves. In this way there develops a clear hierarchy in

the treatment and care for alcoholics. At the bottom of the hierarchy we thus find those alcoholics, drug addicts and homeless that have been classified as hopeless by the traditional treatment and caring system. Some of the most extreme cases are those of homeless mentally ill people experiencing a combined abuse of drug and alcohol.

The discourse on the "heavy men" in Kongens Enghaves Social Security Office reflects a universe which seems to be more defined by rules and regulations and social technologies that the administration has at its disposal – rather than an attempt to determine the needs and living conditions that these men are experiencing. One of the reasons why the social workers find it impossible to deal with these men constructively is because of their expressed lack of knowledge about their background, lives and the local community that the men live in, and the drop-in centres and places-to-be that they utilise and feel a sense of belonging to. Even though the social workers will not expressly define anybody as non-treatable or impossible to work with, in practice it is often a different story – in that many of these men appear as "parked", waiting for help, or put on hold types of cases.

Another reason for why the Social Security Office in Kongens Enghave seems to suffer from a "heavy cases syndrome" is that there has not been a change in the perception of how the marginalization phenomenon has changed from a time of high unemployment to the actual present situation where there is a relatively low level of unemployment. The makeup of the client group has changed significantly from the middle of the nineties to the present. Where many of the clients in the past mainly experienced the problem of unemployment, then the majority now exhibits a combination of a number of social problems over and above unemployment. Consequently it also becomes more difficult for the social workers to come up with convenient and easy "successes". At the same time, the individual social worker experiences the paradox projected by the present day activation policies. In addition to the level of unemployment falling, the activation policies now also address increasingly more diverse groups. All people of working age whom are not ill or early pensioners must be activated. However, individual social workers experience the fact that "heavy men" are very difficult to activate. This is firstly due to the fact that the well known and acknowledged methods of activation policies – and the actual practical utility of these – has little in common with these men's practical sense or habitus (Larsen 1999). Secondly, it is debatable whether activation is a useful and considerate method for addressing the type of social problems that this group of clients experience (Smed 1999).

7. Caring in marginal communities

Social integration through normalisation has been the prime objective in social work with marginalized people over the last 20 years within Denmark and most of the EU nations. The normalisation principle holds that all citizens irrespective of their physical, social or psychological limitations, their age and ethnicity are to be as far as possible

supported and assisted to function in the normal everyday life of the local community. Normalisation is a prerequisite for integration into the family and social networks, into the workforce and into political participation. The normalisation principle has been based on the impression that it is desirable to break down the barriers between average citizens and those that are different. Those that are different should not be isolated from "normal" people and be institutionalised into special enclaves.

Paradoxically, the normalisation principle has for many marginalized people brought with it the fact that they have become "homeless". The closing down of "total institutions" (Goffman 1961) and the placing of marginalized people in the local communities has created new types of integration problems. To inhabit a physical place, a "home", is not the same as feeling at home and having the home function socially and practically. Along with the de-institutionalisation of marginal people, there are not adequate offers of housing, treatment and social opportunities for these people as they moved into the local communities. Consequently, marginal people did not only experience a lack of caring arrangements but they also lacked 'fields of care' (Tuan 1996). By "fields of care" I here mean places in which marginal people can feel emotionally or otherwise particularly connected to. It is such places they long for, and wish to belong to.

Integration based on assimilation does have the in-built bias, that it is only those who are different who need to change, rather than normal people having to change. When the borders between the different and the normal people are not moved, then it can be particularly difficult and painful for those most distant from the world of normality to approach and overcome such borders. To move these people across to the "right side" of the borders can thus take on a characteristic of an assault that can include strong limitations and control which in effect can work against the main goal: to improve peoples' quality of life and promote some kind of social integration. If the mentally ill and vulnerable have become so because of the pressure a stressed and normal life today brings with it or have never experienced what a "normal" life is about then the risk of a unilateral normalisation approach would be that it could worsen the situation. Such a unilateral way of carrying out normalisation and integration has encountered problems in a number of ways. It has been pointed out that such an integration and normalisation approach builds on unsustainable assumptions that marginal groups wish to live, be housed and work like "normal" people (Bømler 1994). Large portions of the experimental projects in social and city policy which operated during the 1980s and 1990s has however, largely acknowledged these facts. Consequently a much greater emphasis is being placed on providing care and creates communities for certain groups of marginals – rather than creates and deals with a normalising type of integration.[5]

[5]At the same time it is crucial to point out that there is an overall political tendency to think that it is best for those who receive social benefits – and society - that they via participation in activation projects, become self-sufficient by getting paid work in the real labour market.

When emphasis politically is placed on the generation of strong communities, then it is not incidental that there simultaneously occurs a much greater emphasis and faith being placed on the idea that voluntary social work can solve a number of social policy challenges, that are seen to lie outside of the scope and capacity of public social work. The increasing social policy emphasis on the local area, the drop-in centres and voluntary social work, points largely to a number of changes in the social policy rationale. The challenge posed to the new urban governance in the 1990's was therefore to fuse housing and social policy in such a way that it constructed a sense of meaning and identity for marginal people as well as for the local community as a whole. This has been done by socially constructing different kinds of communities for different kinds of people or (sub) cultures within the local community.

Drop-in centres

It was particularly during the 1990's that drop-in centres were established in many local communities as an opportunity for marginal people.[6] Drop-in centres can generally be characterised as marginal places for marginal people. These are places for people who are socially isolated in their everyday life, and who have a need for support in order to handle their lives. The centres can therefore generally be seen as frameworks supporting marginal people's communities.

Drop-in centres are directed at, and are used by different groups. In many instances it is the case that considerable overlaps are present among the users. However, there generally exists a clear division between drop-in centres for the mentally ill and centres for alcoholics and drug addicts. This division is however, primarily categorical because within the mentally ill groups we also see a number of people with drug addictions and/or alcohol problems. Thus there is also no clear division between the groups when examined at the level of the individual. But as the mentally ill usually require quiet surroundings, conditions are placed on the behaviour of other clients at the drop-in centres for the mentally ill.

The drop-in centres serve various purposes. For the alcoholics and drug addicts, it is to get them off the streets and from the meeting places in public spaces where they impose on others (Larsen 2001). There are many examples of business owners and shopping centre associations having demanded that the police should remove persons who may have an undesirable affect on customers. The drop-in centres thus function as collection points for people who are swept away from public places as well as a collection point for marginal people that are lonely and isolated. As a part of this "cleaning-up work", a type of outreach is also being carried out. Here social workers outreach to the homeless,

[6]Drop-in centres have, however, been a part of social policy since the 18th century and functioned as places where the homeless and poor were able to get food and shelter. The shelters were run by private and volunteer relief organisations and demand for them have to a large extent been driven by economic cycles and as such the extent of unemployment and poverty (Hansen 1996).

the mentally ill and drug addicts, with the purpose of having them established in their own home, treatment or care institutions, or drop-in centres.

There are great differences in the demands that the drop-in centres place on the clients' active participation within the centres. Where the clients are typically resource-poor, there are few demands in place and the centre function principally as a place of refuge where considerate care and support can be found. Where the clients have more resources, it is expected that they actively participate in activities at the centre. However, for the drop-in centres in Kongens Enghave, it is the case that there is a mixture of clients with various levels of resources, and thus available services are a mixture of individual care and activities that enhance a sense of community. The clients' motives for coming to the centres are also mirrored in the type services offered, that is, which of their needs clients can have satisfied in relation to their particular situation. Some are mainly in need of security and care; some need a meal, and some mostly to engage with others in various activities. However, generally it is the case the clients at the drop-in centres are modest in their needs and expectations of what life has to offer them (Hansen 1996).

Drop-in centres organised by municipalities and local councils are generally established and run as supplementary to existing treatment and care institutions. And it is a normal procedure that these institutions refer clients on to the publicly run drop-in centres. Some of the drop-in centres for the mentally ill have an associated support and contact-person arrangement. Many of the old drop-in centres, as well as the more recent ones, are organised and run by voluntary aid organisations. However, these are often run in co-operation with local councils, and financing of the centres is commonly provided by the use of public funding.

The localisation of the drop-in centres is such that they are normally placed where the clients are found. A characteristic of the establishment of the centres is, however, that often they are met with resistance from the locals who are likely to become neighbours to the clients of a new drop-in centre. Just as tolerance for marginal people is limited in public places, then the same applies when they become the new neighbours. Thus, protests by locals are the rule rather than the exception in the establishment of the centres (Bømler 1996). However, there are significant differences from locality to locality, with regards to the level of tolerance for marginal people. Even though there is a high proportion of marginal people in Kongens Enghave, there is a high degree of tolerance for that which is different. This is undoubtedly the result of the historical fact that the area has always been inhabited by many different types of people and that it has a tradition for helping those that have very limited resources (Kongens Enghave 1998).

As the drop-in centres have again become an important part of what is on offer for marginal people, then this is due, in no small measure, to the rising concentration and visibility of vulnerable and marginal people that are present in certain localities – as for example in Kongens Enghave. The drop-in centres are one avenue for providing

"housing" for those that in one way or another have been excluded from, do not want to or are unable to live within the normal framework of mainstream society. Even though most of the drop-in centres continue to be run by volunteer organisations, they are now mainly financed by public funds from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Housing, rather than from other sources as was the case in the past. At the same time the centres have also developed from being a roof over one's head and a place to get a meal, to one where more emphasis is put on the creation of spaces where social togetherness and caring are of great importance.

Drop-in centres in Kongens Enghave

The most obvious marginal spaces in Kongens Enghave are the three drop-in centres for the mentally ill, "Pegasus", "Amadeus", and "Café Rose". However, other than these, there are other informal drop-in centres, particularly the two drinking clubs that meet in an old shed and an old carriage on Danish Rail property. As well as this, there are a number of marginal spaces in the rest of the district, such as "The Shit Channel" which is an area of self-erected buildings around a sewer outlet[7] and the old Harbour, and other ad-hoc gathering spots in plazas, squares and streets. These *drop-in centres* are marginal places in the public space where people and particularly the marginal and mentally ill people take refuge in the short or long term.

The type of marginalized space that the three formal drop-in centres for the mentally ill in Kongens Enghave particularly represent, are first and foremost spaces of intimacy. That is, spaces where people share everyday experiences, and where in particular, mentally ill people with weak or non-existent social networks, experience their only daily social interaction. It is a space that offers an opportunity for social integration through the community, which occurs and is created there. This is a space, which in this way takes on the characteristics of a "home".

The drop-in centres managers' stories gained from our interviews with them, deals mainly with creating and maintaining a space where there is room for those people that in many ways are excluded from other spaces. This space is not characterised by the same positions and relations existing in the surrounding spaces, and where the users are allocated some other ("lower") symbolic value. A central characteristic of the drop-in centre managers' perception is that they are the creators and implementers of "the symbolic order of everyday life".[8] Even though there may be chaos around the users and in

[7] This area in the periphery of Kongens Enghave is inhibited by 'outcasts' who live in old caravans and shelters and without running water and electricity. In Denmark, this housing area is about the closest one can get in to something that resemble a third world slum area.

[8] The concept of "the symbolic order of everyday life" was originally developed by Beck-Jørgensen (1994) to describe the coping strategies of long-term unemployed lone mothers.

their lives, then the drop-in centres must, according to the managers, represent "normality" in terms of a cosy environment, proper food, neat table set-ups and serving of the meals. This creates "the symbolic order of everyday life", and the drop-in centre managers are of the opinion that this order returns users' dignity to them. "The symbolic order of everyday life" is a way of creating some type of order in an otherwise chaotic and problematic life. It can be seen as a type of symbolic cohesive glue, which influences the user in a positive manner by creating normality and dignity in their daily life.

In a parallel fashion, clients of the drop-in centres refer to the centres as a part of their homely sphere. For many of the users, their own (physical) home is associated with loneliness, boredom and for many of the mentally ill their home is actually a harbouring place for fear and obsessive-compulsive thoughts, whilst the drop-in centre is associated with homeliness in the shape of food, care and social contact. For some their accommodation ("the home") is just a place to be, whilst the drop-in centre is the place where one can feel at home. The drop-in centre is the place where there is social contact, where one can eat a hot meal with others and the place where the social aspects of life can develop.

The drop-in centre may therefore been seen as a part of the clients' home. If the home is only understood or defined as a physical space to be one that protects against wind and weather then this definition ignores peoples' need for social contact and communication. A physical space does not protect against loneliness. The ability of physical space to function in an integrating fashion (to create a meaningful universe and relationships of belonging) assumes that a social functionality can be created in that space. If the home for a person is associated with isolation and a fearful existence, the home represents a problematic place to be. When the drop-in centres create this sociality and fear-reducing environment, then they cannot be viewed in isolation from the person place of residence. Certainly it is the place of residence that gives the person an official identity in society. An address is required for the official register and associated right to a Medicare card, ability to open a bank account etc. Without these links to the different societal systems you are almost a person of non-existence in today's society (Beck 1997). But if it is the drop-in centre that provides a person with their own identity, then the drop-in centre is a part of the home; that is, the place where one feels at home.

8. The politics of marginal space

I conceive drop-in centres and 'places-to-be' for marginal people as *the politics of marginal space*. Because meaning is a product of social spatialisation (Bauman 1993) the politics of marginal space can be seen as a means of constructing places of meaning as well as places of "conduct of conduct". Government was by Foucault (1983) defined by the 'conduct of conduct'. Government or the conduct of conduct can more precisely be defined as "a more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge,

that seeks to shape our conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes." (Dean 1999: 209)

The governmentality is one of an attempt to influence people to make sensible choices and decisions in all aspects of life (Foucault 1983). Rose (1996) talks about the politics of competence that helps and instructs people to take care of their own directions in life. The politics of marginal space can be seen as an attempt to recreate various types of competencies and to influence the behaviour of marginal people. The manifestation of social policies can thus be seen as an attempt to simultaneously create meaningful places-to-be for people and to develop social technologies which influence marginal peoples behaviour.

The type of conduct of conduct that the politics of marginal space is attempting to achieve, can be viewed within the framework of the three different types of dispositifs that Foucault has dealt with, that is law, discipline and bio-politics. These social technologies are not mutually exclusive, in that they in the practical application of micro-power often appear in combination with each other. However, whilst the discipline organises and separate individuals in time and space, the bio-politics attempt to encapsulate the human individual within the normalising processes. The micro-power, which is practised via the discipline and bio-politics, is not necessarily oppressive, but can also be productive through the conduct of conduct that are desired. Foucault has compared the conduct of conduct that the state is trying to achieve through laws, discipline and bio-politics with the pastoral power that the church practised in earlier times. This pastoral power is transferred, integrated and institutionalised in the welfare state's directive rationales and institutions. The new pastoral power directs itself towards both the whole and the individual.

The welfare state is not an unequivocal and one-sided power apparatus, but in relation to the individual, it constitutes a very sophisticated structure in relation to which individuals can be integrated – with the assumption that their individuality can be recreated in a new form and be shaped according to very specific patterns (Foucault 1983: 214). Integration in a community is presented as a possibility with the assumption that an individual is prepared to and in practice, demonstrates that they are willing to, and have the ability to subject themselves to some limitations on their behaviour.

Those who enforce pastoral power aim to "save' individuals and integrate them in community life, in accordance with existing regimes of truth which are established, for example within the social and health field. The execution of pastoral power is not primarily about forcing but eliciting activities that have behavioural effects and thus modifies the behaviour of others. This conduct of conduct is at once and at the same time an expression of ways of guiding others and for acting within more or less open fields of action. The execution of power is thus a question about attempts to handle various possible avenues of action and thus try to arrange the potential outcomes of other's actions.

The execution of power occurs by directing and supporting individuals in a considerate fashion on how to arrange their lives (Hirdman 1990) rather than forcing them to move in a desired direction. In this sense, the execution of power is about having it practised in relation to free individuals. This entails a complicated interaction between power and freedom, and freedom in this interaction is a precondition for power to be utilised constructively; that is, that individuals willingly chose to follow the shepherd's directions. Rather than having power and freedom existing as existential entities and in opposition to each other, Foucault talks about "agonism". This is, a relationship, where at one and the same time, there is in existence guidance and resistance. Power, as well as freedom, are thus never fully established because there are always a room for movement in the relationship between the two. Today, voluntary social work is in many ways perceived as being more able to handle pastoral power because voluntary work, compared to public social work, is to a greater degree seen to be more effective in providing direction and not elicit resistance.

As places of conduct of conduct these marginal places-to-be functions as mediators and stabilisers of the relations between marginal people and the rest of the local community. These marginal places, by creating meaning and feeling of identity, as well as providing care to the inhabitants, lower potential tension and conflict in the community. They are producers and constructors of feelings of safety and trust in the local community.

9. A caring citizenship

The focus in this paper has been on marginal people and especially marginal men's need for care. Marginal people are often overlooked or totally neglected in the discourse on the caring deficit - or they are stigmatised and placed lowest in the hierarchy of who needs and deserves care. Marginal people are those with fewest options and choices in relation to care resources and types of care arrangements. Furthermore, marginal people do not have powerful advocates and they do not themselves have a strong voice in political debates on these matters. In the competition for scarce care resources, marginal people are most likely to lose out. This is why I have asked these two questions: Who cares about and who cares for marginal people. The short answer is that few people care about and for marginal people. They are, as in most other matters concerning their lives, simply marginalized in relation to the issue.

It has been argued that care should be included in the definition of citizenship. To receive care and have time to give care should be part of citizenship rights. Knijn and Kremer argue that "The notion of citizenship should contain the idea that every citizen at some time or another has to take care of people *that they care about*." (1997: 331, my emphasis) However, this approach tends to overlook the problem of caring for marginal people without family and social network ties. Even though Knijn and Kremer's notion of an ungendered and inclusive citizenship contains both the idea of the right to give

and the right to receive care, they do not explicitly address the question of caring about and for the deviant or marginal citizen.

As I have argued in this paper, there is no unconditional right for people to receive care and there seems to be a clear hierarchy and priority in relation to specific groups in need of care. In prioritising scarce resources, marginal men are certainly not at the top of the list. Homeless people, drug addicts and alcoholics are generally perceived as groups having self-inflicted social problems. Many have been given up by the health and social security system. They are, so to speak, deemed outside the universe of help. Not only are these men lacking family relationships, but they are also left in a condition where they lack adequate support and care from public welfare systems. They are either left in care of voluntary organisations or they are on their own. At the local level, however, different types of drop-in centres, and places-to-be for marginal people have been created and often in co-operation between public and volunteer organisations. I have described these spaces as caring communities, which also facilitate identity and meaning for marginal people. On the other hand, this politics of marginal space may become a relatively cheap way of containing, entertaining, and conducting marginal people in the local public space instead of developing more comprehensive and coherent programmes to combat social exclusion and to create social integration. A critical perception of the politics of marginal space is that it represents a new confinement of deviant people. It in not a physical but a symbolically violent confinement as marginal spaces may produce a common sense perception about the limitations one is subordinated to in the social and physical space. Marginal communities with marginal people are self evidently experienced as being condemned to have poor services.

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The active society and activation policy

BY

Jørgen Elm Larsen

Introduction

This paper is focusing on the role of activation policy in the active society. The politics of the active society is to promote active and self-reliant citizens. There is a widespread consensus among the OECD and EU countries about the blessings of the active society. One of the cornerstones in the active society is workfare policy. However, under the banner of workfare policy there are major differences between the countries in how they try to achieve the goals of the active society. Firstly, the paper is dealing with these differences in activation and workfare policies and their different outcomes. Secondly, at the national level it is discussed weather the Danish activation policy should be perceived as enabling or coercive. It is argued that perceptions of Danish activation policy as either enabling or coercive are oversimplified and even misleading judgements. The real world of activation policies and projects display both enabling and coercive features. Thirdly, to show some of the problematic features of Danish activation policy the paper presents results from a study of activation policy and projects in the deprived city district of Kongens Enghave in Copenhagen.[1] It is pointed out that the recent totalisation of activation policy means that even extremely marginal people are now target groups of activation policy. Especially marginal men are by the local social workers perceived as "heavy cases" and difficult to deal with. For many of these "heavy men" participation in activation project is experienced as problematic and not enabling, and for those who have participated in activation projects numerous times activation is experienced as empty ritual acts. Fourthly, in conclusion it is claimed that contemporary politics of the active society in Denmark seem to have too much emphasis on the active part and too little on the caring part of citizenship.

The active society

The old welfare state regimes are everywhere undergoing transformations and the concept of the "active society" has been used, among others the OECD, to catch the turning away from governing through society (Walters 1997). The welfare state society was built on the premises that it should foster integration and harmony between the different classes in society. The welfare state societies shaped – although in very different ways – boundaries and divisions among those who were supposed to perform waged labour and those who were not; especially a division between the male breadwinner and the home working wife. The old national welfare states therefore shaped different kinds of gender,

[1] The empirical material referred to in this paper is based on interview with employees and clients at the local social security office, interview with managers and instructors at local activation projects and clients participating in these projects and interview with employees at and users of "drop-in centres" ("værestеder") for mentally ill, drug addicts, alcoholics and other marginal or lonely people in Kongens Enghave. The local area study of Kongens Enghave is part of the research programme "Gender, Empowerment and Politics" which is financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council 1996-2001. The paper also forms part of my research in relation to the Graduate School for "Integration, Production and Welfare" financed by the Danish Social Science Research Council 2000-2005.

ethnic, generational etc. models or regimes, which have paved different roads into the active society. In contrast to the welfare state society the active society is, in principle, striving at making all citizens workers. The active society is perceived as the best or only way of combating poverty and social exclusion (OECD 1990).[2] However, it would be a mistake to argue that the active society has replaced the welfare society. It seems more reasonable to argue that there is a growing emphasis on governing society through activating the individual in numerous ways - preferably through labour market participation, but also through voluntary social work and community work. Furthermore, the active citizen is supposed to be active in all matters concerning themselves and their family.

A crucial governmentality issue in the creation of the active society is the relocating of obligations and responsibilities to the community level. In the Danish political debate about the future of social policy state interventions and state financing of social programmes is still seen as being crucial for the welfare of citizens, but in Denmark there is an increasing emphasis on the role of communities and the "third sector". Paradoxically, in the midst of the increasing processes of individualisation there has been a new emphasis on the community. The contemporary processes of individualisation are circumscribed by a new communitarian ethic. This communitarian ethic is, however, exactly reinforcing the plight of the citizen to be active. In the Danish context this is made clear by the following statement of the former Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs Karen Jespersen reflecting – while she was still Minister of Social Affairs - upon the "social" challenges faced by the Danish society:

"Today it is more about improving internal rather than external well-being. It concerns the fact that many people are lonely and are in need of self-esteem and social networks, they simply do not have a sense of belonging. It concerns a poverty problem which the government on it's own will not be able to deal with. Individual citizens must, to a much greater degree, take responsibility for others at work, in residential areas, within the family, in organisations etc. Particularly, it is about people being able to take responsibility for them selves if we are to move away from the fact that many people are being taken care of via public funding. This does not mean that government participation should decrease, but that it needs to change. The government should strengthen individual citizen's professional, social and personal expectations with the goal of having them being self-sufficient and become active participants in society's community. Thus we need to have individuals and their opportunities as a central political focal points. However, people only become strong and able to help themselves if they are part of strong communities, in which they take co-responsibility." (Jespersen 2000)

When I emphasise this statement by the former Danish minister of Social Affairs, then it is not only because it expresses a general tendency in Danish social policy thought and

[2] Seen from another perspective, the active society is also perceived as a way of coping with the "caring deficit" – that is the growing demand for care resources due to, among other things, low fertility rates and a growing population of elderly and especially frail elderly people (Larsen 2001).

practice, but that this is also happening in other European countries. At the EU level, great emphasis is being placed on community action programmes, partnership models, and welfare mix that are being promoted as "good practice" within the social policy arena. That is co-operation and a division of labour between private, public and volunteer actors and organisations regarding the production and delivery of welfare services.

The implication of the move from a "welfare society" to an "active society" and with this a move from "citizenship rights" to "active citizenship" is "... a new emphasis on the personal responsibilities of individuals, their families and their communities for their own future well-being and upon their own obligation to take active steps to secure this" (Rose: 1996: 327-28). Rose terms this new governmental way as *government through community*. Community has become a spatialization of government. It is characterised by a governing "... through regulated choices made by discrete and autonomous actors in context of their particular commitments to families and communities" (Rose 1996: 328). Urban renewal programmes, for example, try to re-invent and reconstruct certain inner-city areas as "communities" by mobilising local groups and actors in these community construction projects. In these community construction processes marginal people are to be "empowered" by experts teaching, coaching and persuading them to conduct themselves in relation to some particular norms and to be able to achieve rational self-management.

Activation as a cornerstone in the active society

There are many different interpretations of the background and the motives for the promotion of the active society. However what should be clear from the start is, as implicated in the quotation above, that the concept of an active society is not only a neoliberal invention. Almost every party support the idea of an active society and it does indeed lie at the heart of the third way Social Democratic political rhetoric and practice. The concept of an active society is, however, a very imprecise concept, which embraces very different approaches of whom to make citizens active and on what terms. But one clear notion in the concept of the active society is self-reliance. Self-reliance is a dominating element in the reshaping of social policy (Halvorsen 1998). The concept of self-reliance involves a strong emphasis on the individual and on the will to work. Self-reliance is seen as the opposite to (welfare) dependency. Walters (1996) argues that unemployment and the unemployed has become a guinea-pig in the search for solutions that make people "active" and self-reliant. Especially in the field of unemployment management a whole series of new social technologies are employed to make the subject "active", for example action planning and contractual-style "agreement" between the social benefit claimant and the welfare agency.

Accordingly, one of the corner stones of the new active society is activation policy. Active labour market policies are definitely not a new phenomena, but there is clearly a difference between the old active labour market policy and the new activation policy.

Firstly, activation policy is much more focused on the supply side than on the demand side. Secondly, because of the focus on the supply side the single individual is at the centre of policy initiatives. It is interesting to note that many of the people that are now considered as target groups of the activation policy were formerly active on the labour market or were actively seeking jobs but due to the employment crisis and changing labour market conditions they were either laid off or were not able to get a job. Now activation policies seek to mould these people so that they fit into these changed conditions on the labour market and if they are not able or willing to be "transformed" individuals suiting the new conditions on the labour market they are classified and stigmatised as lazy, marginal, heavy, deviant etc and as belonging to a dependency culture.[3] There seems to be a strange shift in the demanding part. Earlier on the labour movements and unemployed people demanded of society to create jobs for the unemployed and marginal people. Now the demanding part is "society". Demands have been turned into obligations on behalf of society, but on terms that often do not meet neither the expectations and needs nor the experiences and qualifications of the unemployed person. The idea of the active society based on workfare initiatives builds on an asymmetric relationship of rights and obligations since focus is overwhelmingly on the single individuals obligations to be active and self-reliant and much less on governmental obligations to combat discrimination and structural barriers against inclusion on the labour market on decent terms.[4]

Social policy is to day increasingly seen as part of policies moving or pushing people towards the active society. In that sense social policy is also much more labour market orientated than before and its objective is primarily seen as labour market integration of marginal people. This is reflected in the measures employed in that they seek to break down the division between work and welfare (Walters 1997). At the policy level there is no longer a clear distinction between workers and non-workers.

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[3] However, summing up the findings from several comparative studies of work commitment in the EU countries Gallie (2000) concludes that: "The comparative evidence then provides little support of the view that the unemployed are less motivated to be in employment than others and, with the exception of married women in gender traditional countries, there is no evidence that such motivation is adversely affected by relatively high levels of unemployment benefits. Overall the emphasis placed on the dangers for work motivation of welfare systems seems to be sharply contradicted by the evidence." (Gallie 2000: 5) Especially evidence from the Nordic countries disproves the thesis that high welfare benefits are lowering the incentives to work. The highest commitment to work was found among unemployed in Denmark and Sweden followed by the unemployed in the Netherlands – all three countries with high benefit levels for the unemployed.

[4] Looking at the demand side it seems that drastic changes in dispositions and orientations both at the level of firm policy and at the level of employees are needed to open up for the integration of marginalized "outsiders". Research in, for example Denmark, shows in general a positive attitude towards, for example, integration of handicapped people. However, when employees are asked if they them selves want to work together with handicapped people they are much more hesitating (Olsen 2000).

Rights and obligations in the active society

Across the political spectrum – from "third way" Social Democrats to neo-liberals and conservatives - there seems to be a consensus about the principle of reciprocity: no rights without obligations. Kildal (2001) argues, however, that the idea of justice inherent in the reciprocity-based welfare policies has been set aside in the implementation of workfare policies. In contemporary society labour market conditions are rapidly changing, and so are the welfare system, the family and the civil society. Therefore, according to Kildal "The obligations to work raises important questions about the availability of jobs and the level of pay necessary to lift families out of poverty. If the goal of welfare policy is to make poor citizens self-sufficient, this goal is a cruel joke if the jobs are not secure or if they don't provide decent working conditions." (2001: 13)

The concept of workfare has, as so many other concepts, been imported from the US. Workfare programmes in the US have aimed at "end welfare as we know it" (Walker 1999) by "work-for-your-welfare" (Nathan 1993).[5] The Anglo-Saxon countries (Britain, Australia and New Zealand) adopted related policies. Workfare can be perceived as an instrumental means for the shaping of conduct. Dean (2000) argues that government is not only about various forms of "conduct of conduct"[6] and of governing through freedom but also about governing by power and violence. Dean reads workfare as micro-violence, that is a symbolic and treat of violence as it is accompanied by an ultimate sanction of withdrawal of assistance and then the means of life as well as a designation of life which is deemed "unworthy". Especially in liberal welfare states such as the American and Australian it appears to be a paradox that the highly valued and protected personal freedom, for example in relation to unemployed social assistance claimants has been violated by intrusion into spheres of privacy and individual volition. Shaver (2001) argues that the new Australian Welfare Reform fundamentally has changed the relation between the citizen and the state: "Hidden in the shift from rights to conditional support, and from sovereignty to supervision, is a withdrawal of freedom of selfhood as the price of welfare assistance" (Shaver 2001: 13). However, calling into question the self-understanding and self-evidence of the liberal mode of government Dean (2001) is arguing that liberal governing "... in the name of freedom... concerns how to use the full range of governmental and sovereign technologies from persuasion, encouragement, seduction, enticement, obligation, petty humiliation, shame, discipline, training, and propaganda, through to violence – in its different forms – and the symbolic and threat of

[5] Workfare programmes like the American may reduce "welfare dependency" but it does not seem to be effective in reducing poverty (Evans 2001). These kind of workfare programmes force welfare clients to work at the bottom of the labour market in low paid jobs and without any possibilities of achieving new qualifications which could offer mobility possibilities.

[6] The conduct of conduct or government can more precisely be defined as "a more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape our conduct by working through our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes." (Dean 1999: 209)

violence, in a manner which can be reconciled with the claim, always understood nominalistically, to govern liberally, to govern in a free political culture, to govern in the name of freedom, to respect individual liberty, or to govern through freedom." (Dean 2001: 25)

Since government is about the conduct of conduct all necessary social technologies are employed to shape the citizen in such a way that he/she is able to practice freedom in an active, self-reliant and responsible way. Workfare or activation policies have in contemporary Western societies been perceived as being the best or only way of pursuing these goals. Both the European Commission and the OECD have recommended a shift from passive to active labour market measures. During the past decade, most European welfare states have adapted some kind of workfare or activation policies in their overall unemployment policy. The new active line in labour market and social policy has been introduced under different names in the different European welfare states. In Norway it has been called "the work line", in Denmark "the active line", in the United Kingdom "welfare to work", in the Netherlands "work, work, work" and in France "RMI" (Revenu Minimum dÍnsertion). These active measures have become of prime importance in reforming the welfare systems and in stimulating or forcing labour market participation of unemployed and other social benefit claimants (Oorschot 1999).

The apparent parallel international trend in activation policies does, however, not follow a common track and activation policies do not lead in the same direction. Activation is a general and imprecise concept, which have very different national meanings, backgrounds and implications. Furthermore, it is often misleading to treat activation and workfare as one and the same thing, because workfare and activation *in principle* refer to rather different approaches and strategies. Activation policy are in some ways close to active labour market policies since the main objective is to create possibilities for reintegration on the labour market through participation in training, education, activation projects etc. Workfare is primarily based on forcing unemployed people to take up a job or training. In practice, however, the opportunity and the sanction approach are often combined using both the carrots and the sticks in making unemployed people work (Kosonen 1998).

The notion of workfare covers a wide range of institutional realities (Gallie 2000). In a study of six countries (Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK) it was shown that most schemes departed from a pure workfare model in several ways. Firstly, "work-for-benefits" was only one of the alternatives that unemployed people were offered, since opportunities for employment in subsidised jobs with higher earning than the benefits or with a normal wage was also an option in most schemes. Secondly, in most cases the unemployed would not lose all of their welfare benefit for non-compliance (Gallie 2000). On the other hand, activation policies represent a major shift by bridging the spheres of social policy and active labour market policy, which in most EU countries previously have existed as separate spheres. However, there are major differences between the EU countries in regard to the comprehensiveness of the

schemes. In the Netherlands the magnitude and diversity of measures are probably larger than in any other EU country (Lind and Møller 2001, referring to Hespanha and Hansen 1998)). In Austria and in Germany where workfare traditionally has not played an important role in relation to social assistance claimants activation policies have become much more important in the 1990's (Hanesch 2001). In the Southern European countries activation policy is of recent date, modest in scope and with major regional differences (Gallie 2000, Hanesch 2001, Lind and Møller 2001).

In general it is possible to distinguish between two different approaches to *work fare in relation to social assistance schemes* (Hanesch 2001, Lødemel and Trickey 2001, European Foundation 1999 and OECD 1998). The first approach is primarily focusing on restricting the access to social assistance and this approach is based on the view that welfare recipients are dependent on welfare. The second approach emphasises the importance of developing the social assistance claimant's "human resources" and providing opportunities for labour market participation in stable employment. The second approach is close to the traditional active labour market policy approach which combine a balanced focus on both demand and supply side while the first approach is becoming more and more dominant in welfare reform discourses and practices both among the OECD and EU member states.[7] Workfare or activation policies are therefore designed differently according to chosen approach. However, most national schemes stress both functions and employ a combination of disciplining and enabling measures.

Seen from the perspective of the Nordic countries and especially Sweden the work line is not of recent date. The commitment to maintain full employment has been strong in Sweden since the 1950's (Jensen, Larsen and Olofsson 1987) and Sweden has until recently used the main part of expenditures on labour market policy on active measures. In general the Nordic countries have sine the 1960's been among those countries that have spend most on labour market policy measures. In terms of the percentage of spending used on active measures Denmark and Finland have moved closer to Sweden, and Norway have even overtaken Sweden in the late 1990's. Even though elements of the so called Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1994) have been introduced in the Nordic countries during the 1990's the Nordic work line is, according to Kosonen "... still less coercive and the benefits are more generous than e.g. in the British or US systems." (1998: 14) However, especially in Norway it has been emphasised that employment is both a right and a duty and being unemployed for even a few weeks is considered as an evil (Lødemel and Trickey 2001).

Workfare and inclusion

[7] However, there is enough evidence to suggest that the welfare dependency hypothesis in general have little to do with the reality of social assistance claimants (for example Leisering and Walker 1998, refer also to note 2).

What are the outcomes of workfare or activation policies in terms combating poverty and social exclusion? Berkel (2001) argues that passive and active social policy measures have different objectives since they aim at inclusion in different domains of society. Passive measures supply people with financial means to survive without engaging in people's activity or network patterns. Active measures are directly concerned with people's possibilities of participation in different domains. However, active and passive measures are interrelated since they – although in different ways – are about survival and participation, and in practice active and passive measures are often combined. But recent reforms are more about replacing passive with active measures than combining them, for example in the Netherlands. In other cases where income maintenance policy does not exist for certain groups, for example young people, active measures are implemented instead of passive measures, for example Revenue Minimum d'Insertion in France. In the Nordic countries the receipt of social assistance is conditional of participation in activation measures.

Generally active measures build on the assumptions that unemployment leads to social exclusion and perhaps poverty while waged work leads to inclusion. These assumptions have been challenged in several ways. First of all, there are other roads to inclusion than waged work, for example voluntary and community work. Not all unemployed people are or feel them selves excluded from other domains of social life (Gallie 1999, Hansen 2001a, Berkel 2001, Halvorsen and Johannessen 2001, Goul Andersen 2001). In a critical review of the Nordic workfare policies, Kildal (1998) argues that activation is not a question about economic, social or political integration, because the Nordic welfare states to a high degree protect citizens against these types of marginalisation, and several studies have shown that there is no automatic relation between unemployment and economic, social and political marginalisation. Therefore, activation policy is more about "moral integration" and "moral competence" – that is to prove an inner willingness to work (Carstens 1998).

Although Kronauer (1993) on the one hand points out that "... we can no longer assume a single or even merely a dominant pattern for the experience and assimilation of unemployment" (p. 6), he maintains on the other hand that '... the variety of experiences and ways of coping with unemployment still reflect the socializing power the social institution of gainful employment has over those who have been temporarily or permanently excluded from it." (p. 8) Studies of the effects of activation policies, however, point at limited effects in longer-term employment stability and in the quality of the jobs that people obtained. The targeting of long-term unemployed and especially partially disabled social assistance claimants with micro-politics has not in general been a successful approach in terms of labour market integration. Many participants in activation projects are locked in and circulate from one project to another (Berkel 2001). Helping people to find a job does not automatically mean that they will achieve social integration, because social integration, for one thing, "... is likely to be heavily conditioned by the quality of the jobs they get." (Gallie 2000: 11) The types of activation offer given to the clients very likely obscure socialising the citizen to be committed to work. The clients

are often offered temporary, low qualified and poorly paid jobs, which they perceive more as a punishment than as an opportunity. Pulling the social security benefit net away and replacing it with activation policies, which have shown to have limited effects on combating social exclusion, is a punishment and not a helping hand to the long-term unemployed. As surveys show this punishment can not even be legitimised by lacking work motivation among the unemployed.

Several studies have pointed out that participation in activation projects and training activities has to be tailor made to the single unemployed individual if it is to be successful. However, according to Standing (1999) in most cases this is not how activation policies work since most of them are solely work orientated and paternalistic. Focusing solely on inclusion through labour market participation often prevent that the unemployed participate in activities outside the labour market. In cases where more individualistic approaches are used it is seldom that the unemployed has a real say on how the activation process is planned. On the contrary, individualistic approaches are often used to decide weather the clients meet the conditions for participation in activation projects or not and to motivate those who meet the conditions. However, for those unemployed who are more or less permanent participants in activation project there is a real danger of further marginalisation because their expectations of developing useful qualifications and mobility possibilities are disappointed. In a survey of workfare policies in the EU countries it is concluded that "... instead of stressing on individual responsibilities and obligations, the demand for 'active' policies should be understood as the necessity of an anti-poverty strategy at national as well as local level. It must become clear that the welfare state has to play an active role in the fight of poverty and exclusion and that long-term economic and social productivity of the welfare state goes far beyond short-term costs." (Hanesch 2001: 13-14)

The turn from passive to active labour market and social policy in Denmark

Since the beginning of the unemployment crisis in the mid 1970's several schemes has been implemented in Denmark to reduce unemployment. Up until 1994 the Job Offer Scheme (introduced in 1978) was the most important instrument to secure that the long-term unemployed did not lose their right to unemployment benefits. In 1985 the Job Offer Scheme was supplemented with the possibility to receive an enterprise allowance or an educational allowance. In 1988 an Educational Offer Scheme was introduced.[8] After participation in a job offer the unemployed could continue to receive unemployment benefits. In principle, an unemployed person eligible for unemployment benefits could from his/hers 18 years of age and until the age of 60 years by turns receive unem-

[8] The employment effect of the job offer scheme in combination with educational offers has been estimated to be about 40 % (Kongshøj Madsen 1992). For an overview of the Danish unemployment policy from the mid 1970's to 1990 see, for example, Larsen (1991).

ployment benefits and job offers. The Early Retirement Wage Scheme was introduced at the same time as the Job Offer Scheme and its goal was mainly to pull elderly unemployed people out of the unemployment insurance system. Unemployed people aged 60 years were forced to go on early retirement wage, while it has been a voluntarily early retirement possibility for employed people aged 60 years and above. However, the Early Retirement Wage Scheme was used of many employed people and it is estimated that the retirement of employed people did create some space at the labour market for young people (Andersen and Larsen 1993a). During the 1970´s and 1980´s the active part of the Danish unemployment policy was primarily designed in such a way that it secured the long-term unemployed peoples' right to maintain their unemployment benefits.

In the 1980´s, some social scientists pointed out that the Danish labour market and social policy was too passive in relation to unemployed people (Andersen and Larsen 1989). Many able-bodied, work motivated and well-functioning unemployed people were kept on passive public support for years or circulated between benefits and job offers/education offers without the prospect of stable integration on the labour market (Larsen and Andersen 1993a). Especially, insufficient active approaches towards those young people who were not able to enter the labour market due to high unemployment in the early eighties was a major factor in the creation of "the lost generation" (Socialkommissionen 1992). About 15 percent of those young people who entered the labour market in the early eighties remained on public support during the 1980´s and early 1990's. Many of those who were constantly on public support during the unemployment crisis still remained on public support when unemployment radically decreased from 1994 to 2001.[9] Accordingly, the integration of young people on the labour market became one of the most crucial factors in the debate about transforming unemployment policies from passive to active policies.

Some argue that the paradigmatic change from passive to active labour market and social policy took place in 1994 when a new labour market reform was introduced by the Social Democratic government. However, the shift from passive to active unemployment policy was underway since the late 1980's (Andersen and Larsen 1993b). In 1988, the Prime Minister of the right wing government, Poul Schluter, proclaimed a "new social vision". The basic principle of the new social vision was that all social security benefit recipients, who are able-bodied, should be employed. Those who were supported by the state had to accept work, if society was to support them but "The wage given [for the work] has to be so low that people can just get by. It should not be so high that it becomes a permanent solution." (Schluter 1988)

This proclamation about "work for the dole" signalled a shift in the right wing government's policy since it until then had been opposed to offensive employment policies. Among other things, in 1982 the right wing government abolished the Job Creation and

[9] The latest unemployment figures from the European Commission (October 3 2001) show that the unemployment rate in August 2001 was 4.3% in Denmark. The EU 15 unemployment rate was 8.3% compared to 8.7% in August 2000.

Youth Guarantee Schemes that had been introduced under the former Social Democratic government. Until the late 1980's, the right wing government was convinced that the market forces basically it self would be able solve the unemployment problem. But the rising unemployment from the mid 1980's challenged this view and furthermore the rising unemployment challenged another basic ideology of the right wing government: that the unemployed and others of working age should not be supported passively by the state over a long period of time.

The so-called "Sauntehus proposal" in 1990 later on led to activation efforts for the 18 to 19 years old. Those efforts to activate the youngest clients in the social assistance system triggered of what was later know as the "active line" in Danish social and labour market policy. Gradually the activation efforts were expanded and in 1992 the Parliament passed the "Activation Agreement" according to which, among other things, all unemployed people under 25 years of age on social assistance benefits had an right and an obligation to take an activation offer. If the activation offer were refused the unemployed youngster would no longer be entitled to benefits. However, the labour market reform in 1994 concerning unemployed receiving unemployment benefits and the labour market reform in 1996 concerning unemployed receiving social assistance constituted the peak of the new active line. Social Democratic governments implemented these reforms. The maximum period for receiving unemployment benefits was reduced from about 10 years to 7 years, in 1995 to 5 years and recently to four years. These 4 years are divided into two periods: the benefit and the activation period. The duration of the benefit period is one year and the duration of the activation period is three years. In the activation period the unemployed person has both a right and an obligation to receive different kinds of job training and education offers. If the unemployed person do not get a regular job during or after the activation period he/she loses the right to unemployment benefits and is dependent on social assistance.

The labour market reform also altered the administrative system. 14 regional labour market councils were created to take responsibility and to have the competence of the activation of the insured unemployed people. The regional labour market councils have a whole range of policy options in their command. The individual "action plan" is one of the most important policy instruments.[10] The unemployed person has both a right and an obligation to have an action plan. The action plan
is a contractual-type agreement between the unemployed person and the system. The action plan defines the goal of the activation period and it determines the means by which the goal is to be reached.

[10] Action planning and learning-centred forms of pedagogy are techniques used to involve the subject to take an active role in the management of their own training and well being (see for example Dean 1995). Training and life long learning are central in the process of maintaining skills in a situation where labour marked conditions are more and more flexible and insecure and where the notion of stable careers is fast disappearing.

The municipalities have command over similar instruments in their efforts to activate unemployed social assistance claimants. Social assistance claimants also have a right and an obligation to reach an agreement with the social worker about an action plan. A difference between unemployment benefit recipients and social assistance recipients is that social assistance recipients can participate in activities that are not strictly labour market oriented. Some social assistance claimants are perceived as too resource weak (having other severe problems than being unemployed) to participate in normal job training and educational measures. They participate in what has been termed "social activation" aiming at improving the quality of their lives.[11]

The Danish activation line: governing with the sticks or the carrots

From 1995 to 1999 there was an increase at 25 per cent in the number of unemployed people participating in activation measures and in the same period the number of unemployed dropped considerably. This development shows how strong the political commitment is to activate unemployed people. However, many of those who remained unemployed during the employment boom are characterised by having other problems than being unemployed. Therefore, the pressing questions are what are the limits of activation policy and when does activation policy runs counter to its intended goals?

The interpretations of the labour market reforms among social scientists have been rather diverse. Some have seen the reforms as enabling while others have seen them as coercive (Jensen 1999). Among those who are primarily critical towards the activation line Hansen, Lind and Møller (2000), for example, argue that the contemporary workfare line mainly has to be explained by the fear of the Social Democrats that a growing part of the Danish population will no longer support the welfare state. In this case "Workfare policies are important for maintaining and legitimising a relatively high level of unemployment benefits, but also a necessary remedy for avoiding neo-liberal solutions for labour market regulation." (Hansen et al. 2000: 16) Furthermore, Lind and Møller (2001) claim that "The concepts – paradox problems, structure problems and bottleneck problems – and the argumentation has changed in the course of time, but the problem seem to be the same: the supply of manpower is insufficient to satisfy the buyers' need for cheap labour." (p. 10) Among those who are primarily positive towards the activation line Torfing (1999), for example, argues that Denmark has adopted an offensive workfare strategy, which is disarticulated from the British and American counterpart. According to Torfing, the Danish workfare strategy has, for example, put significant emphasis on activation rather than on benefit and minimum wage reductions, on improving the skills and work experience of the unemployed rather than merely increasing their mobility and job-searching efficiency and on empowerment rather than on control and punishment. Furthermore, according to Jensen (1999) no unemployed person is, in principle, subject to meaningless activation.

[11] For a more extensive overview of the 1994/1996 labour market reforms see, for example, Hansen (1999), Kongshøj Madsen (1999) and Torfing (1999).

Judging the active line as either enabling or coercive seems, however, to be an oversimplified or a misleading judgement since the evaluations of the activation line to a high degree are based on the chosen focus of the observer. Perspectives and conclusions seem to be highly dependent, for example on weather the focus is on activation of unemployment benefit recipients or on social assistance recipients and on short-term unemployed or on the most vulnerable of the long-term unemployed.

For one thing, there is a great variation in the employment effects of activation offers. In general, aggregate evaluations of the effects of activation show that among those who received unemployment benefits in 1995 about 50 % were not receiving public support three years after their activation offer ended, 20 % received unemployment benefits and 8 % were in activation. A few percent received social assistance or early retirement pension (Hansen 1999). Evaluations also show that the employment effect of activation among the short-term unemployed receiving unemployment benefits has been markedly improved during the latter part of the 1990's.[12] Among the long-term unemployed recipients of unemployment benefits there have not been an improvement of the employment effect of activation. However, today a much higher percentage of these are now receiving activation offers (Langager 1997, Arbejdsmarkedsstyrelsen 1999).

Among those who received social assistance in 1997 23% were in ordinary jobs and 21% in education a half year after they ended their activation offer. 26 % were in activation and 29% unemployed (Weise and Brogaard 1997). Among those who received social assistance in 1995 about 40 % were not receiving public support three years after their activation offer ended, 10 % received unemployment benefits. About 15% received other kinds of public support, for example sickness benefits or early retirement pension, about 20 % were in activation projects in the municipalities and about 20% received social assistance (Hansen 1999).

Since 1994 the number of social assistance claimants has decreased, but those remaining clients are characterised by having long-term spells of social assistance (Filges 1999). The long-term social assistance recipients seem to get stocked in the system. Many of the long-term recipients who leave the system return again after a period of time. The re-cycling of long-term unemployed, which characterised the old Job Offer Scheme for insured unemployed now seem to be repeated in the social assistance system for long-term recipients. Since work in activation projects no longer qualifies for entrance into the unemployment benefit system the long-term unemployed on social

[12] However, it is difficult to conclude weather activation measures in them selves have been successful or not since it is impossible to know how the conditions of the unemployed would have been if they had not received an activation offer – especially in a period with growing employment rates. For an extension on this argument see Hansen (2001b).

assistance remains in the social assistance system if they are unable to get a normal job.[13]

For a large group of marginal unemployed people it seems that it is almost impossible to activate them in normal conditions due to the presence of severe social, psychological or health problems. Exactly for this reason the totalisation of the Danish workfare line seems to express a paradox, since unemployment has decreased considerably in Denmark during the nineties. Particularly when this new legislation is applied to social assistance recipients there occurs a shift from a right and objectively based judgement of whether the person is defined as unemployed or not, to a means tested judgement. Now the social assistance recipient has to show motivation and inner willingness to work (Olsen 1999). The personal judgement of the caseworker of the recipient's willingness to work has been called "a black hole of democracy", that is a situation where normal democratic procedures are out of work (Carstens 1998). The two often contradictory principles behind the activation legislation, to uphold common norms and values of the work ethic and to strengthen the individual client's possibilities for autonomy and (self) development, are weighted differently from one social office unit to another and from one caseworker to another. The treatment of recipients therefore varies greatly depending on where and by whom the recipient is treated. In principle the client and the caseworker have to agree on an "action plan" which outlines what is to occur with regard to education, job training etc, and when it should happen. The client's personal situation and wishes have to be taken into consideration and negotiated. But in the end the caseworker can make a decision and has the power to deny further social assistance if the client refuse to co-operate and agree on the "action plan".

Especially in relation to social assistance claimants there has been a series of critical and mainly qualitative studies of Danish activation measures.[14] However, even the most critical studies of activation find it hard to conclude that the consequences for those activated are all but negative. Many clients are ambivalent about their activation. The overall assessment of activation from most people in activation projects is that their wellbeing has improved during the period they have been activated. They do especially experience positive effects in relation to their social life and working life. However, there is no consensus among the unemployed about positive effects on their economic condition and on their leisure time. In relation to political participation most do not experience any changes (refer for example to Langager 1997 regarding unemployed receiving unemployment benefits and Weise and Brogaard 1997; Socialministeriet 1991 and Engelund, Klausen and Olsen 1992 concering unemployed receiving social assis-

[13] The most successful activation offers is job training in private firms and the least successful are job training in public agencies. The reasons for the low success rate in public job training are one the one hand that the most vulnerable unemployed are placed here and on the other that public agencies are not able to employ those activated after the activation period has ended.

[14] I will not repeat these analysis and critics here, but just refer to Carstens 1998, Mik-Meyer 1999, Jensen and Pless 1999, Ebsen et. al 1999, Mik-Meyer and Sørensen 2000 and Hansen 2001a.

tance). Generally speaking, it seems that what is important for most clients is when activation establishes time and space regularities in their everyday life, and when they experience social contact and communion with other people during the day.[15] Also attempts to reduce or eliminate forced aspects of activation programmes and to create trust and respect between clients and the employees on the projects are of prime importance (Jensen and Pless 1999, Olsen, Nygaard, Rasmussen and larsen 2000). It is crucial to meet the at risk groups on their own terms and respect their lives without making an ideal out of an at risk lifestyle.

Weather the activation projects have the characteristic of forced workfare or of care and help for the individual client depends to a high degree on how the legislation is implemented locally. The importance of locality is, however, not only related to differences in local "activation regimes" and to differences between caseworkers, but more fundamentally to the composition of the local population. Unemployed and marginal people are not evenly spread out in the social space. Some local areas and city districts have a high concentration of unemployed and marginal people while others have few. In the following results from a study of activation policy in a local area with a high concentration of marginal people is presented.[16]

Governing the souls at the margin

By Danish standards, Kongens Enghave is considered to be an extremely disadvantaged area. This city district in Copenhagen has the highest percentage of unemployment in Denmark and the average income is very low. One third of the population between 16 to 66 years of age is outside the labour market and most of these receive long-term or permanent public support. Furthermore, more than 20 percent of the population is above 65 years of age. The district is often seen as and described by those outside of it, but also by its own inhabitants as being socially disadvantaged. At the same time, however, Kongens Enghave represents a lively civil society with many active organisations as well many formal and informal social activities. Kongens Enghave can more precisely be understood as a traditional local working class community within a post-traditional and post-industrial metropolis. Typically many of the local inhabitants that have lived there all or most of their lives see many good qualities associated with it and want to stay living there (Bille and Lund 1979, Gut 2000). This is not least due to the fact that most people still perceive Kongens Enghave's public spaces as friendly and communicative. But as in many other deprived districts of European cities, Kongens Enghave is experiencing a "crisis of reproduction" of the working class and its culture (Fowler

[15] Wilson (1998), for example, argues that work is a (self)-disciplining factor, which determines where one is going to, and remains for a certain period of time during the day. Work therefore seems to be an anchor for the spatial and temporal regulation of every day life. If one is out of work for too long it is more difficult to re-establish this spatial and temporal regulation of every day life.

[16] See note 1.

1996) and this especially apply to unskilled working class men (Andersen and Larsen 1998).

Risk communities and social work

The crisis of the reproduction of unskilled male worker's life world is both a structural and a personal one. The lack of unskilled wage work and many years on public support often combined with the splitting up of families and living through identity crises have produced risky and deviant life styles among certain marginal men. In the public discourse these risky life styles are highlighted as risk communities. Among these risk communities are homeless people, drug addicts and alcoholics. Some of these people have more or less since their childhood – not least due to neglect – been in precarious conditions and have never entered into "normal" living arrangements. These risk communities are often also highlighted as those that are the most difficult to reach by public social policy. People living in risk communities are increasingly dealt with by a closer co-operation between public and volunteer organisations.

Public social work is subject to political determined working parameters and has in many ways very different working conditions compared to voluntary social work. However, often the two are seen as complimentary – each with its own issues and ways of dealing with them. It is especially in social work with certain marginal groups, such as the homeless and mentally ill, that voluntary social work is perceived as much more effective for establishing contact and providing humane care compared to that offered by public social arrangements. At least this is the way that the relationship between public and voluntary social work is primarily viewed from the political perspective (refer to Socialministeriet/The Ministry of Social Affairs 1997 and 1998). However, this apparent complementary relationship between public and voluntary social work is not only of a symbiotic nature, but also takes on contrary aspects when it concerns integration of certain groups of marginal people. The social life of many marginal people in Kongens Enghave is closely associated with those drop-in centres that are run by volunteer organisations as well as other meeting places for marginal people in the district. Their social integration is here particularly dependent on their degree of marginality and lack of self-sufficiency. On the other hand, the basis for their maintenance is dependent on their role as client at the local Social Security Office, and the primary objective of public social work is to create a normalised integration such that marginal people can provide for their own living. This is especially manifested in the activation policy. Thus the success of public social work is also dependent on whether marginal people can be moved out of those marginal communities that they move within and feel particularly part of. In this sense there is clearly dilemmas and tensions in the different approaches to the "politics of marginal space"; that is how to governing the souls on the margin (Larsen 2001 and 2002). With regard to this task the staff at the local Social Security Office feel as if they continually run into a brick wall. This is because that in Kongens Enghave there is a particular group of men who are very difficult to separate from the

marginal communities they belong to. These men are described as "heavy cases" by the social workers, and are seen as being more or less outside the reach of regular social work practices. In Kongens Enghave's Social Security Office, the label "heavy cases" is applied to those clients that seem remote from the social workers perception of normality, and who are seen to be very difficult to do anything with. The "heavy cases" appear almost all to be men, and are characterised as "poor fellows" that have lost their jobs and families, and most are heavy drinkers or have other drug dependencies. Simultaneously, the social workers feel that they do not have the methods, tools or social technologies, which is required to help or influence these men to change the way they live their lives.[17]

The social workers establish a certain "regime of truth" and thus a particular self-perception within the Social Security Office, which in turn determines the internal systemic relationships and the systems relationship to the external world. In addition a "regime of practice" (Foucault 1991) develops which simultaneously excludes both the images of reality of the "heavy men" and establishes them as deviants. At the same time the exclusion also becomes a condition for inclusion in the social security system. By defining some clients as "heavy cases", they are allocated to a special area, to the "heavy cases division" as it is called internally at the Social Security office in Kongens Enghave, and they are included in a particular discourse about what the system can do with them in relation to, for example, how they can most appropriately be activated. With the latest changes in Danish activation policies since 1998, virtually all registered unemployed people of 18 to 60 years of age have to engage in an activation programme, irrespective of their age and other social problems. Thus activation will eventually become a reality at some point or other, for the large and mixed group of marginal men in Kongens Enghave, irrespective of the type and severity of the social problems they have. The only exceptions being early age pensioners and clinically diagnosed mentally ill people. Everybody must therefore be self-sufficient, self-directed and take joint responsibility for their own life and for others in the community. On the other hand, there is an increased awareness, not least among certain local institutions and professionals, of the difficulties involved in the attempted normalisation of all people. The mentally ill, drug addicts, alcoholics and the socially handicapped can not in the short term be easily and cost effectively – if at all – socialised and included in the normal labour market, family or social networks.

However, especially the discourse on the "heavy men" in Kongens Enghaves Social Security Office reflects a universe which seems to be more defined by rules and regulations and social technologies that the administration has at its disposal rather than an attempt to determine the needs and living conditions that these men are experiencing. One of the reasons why the social workers find it impossible to deal with these men constructively is because of their expressed lack of knowledge about their background,

[17] One third of the male clients at Kongens Enghaves Social Security Office are classified as former or active alcohol abusers (Bruhn 2001).

lives and the local community that the men live in, and the drop-in centres and places-to-be that they utilise and feel a sense of belonging to. Even though the social workers will not expressly define anybody as non-treatable or impossible to work with, in practice it is often a different story – in that many of these men appear as "parked", waiting for help, or put on hold types of cases.[18]

Another reason for why the Social Security Office in Kongens Enghave seems to suffer from a "heavy cases syndrome" is that there has not been a change in the perception of how the marginalization phenomenon has changed from a time of high unemployment to the actual present situation where there is a relatively low level of unemployment. The makeup of the client group has changed significantly from the middle of the nineties to the present. Where many of the clients in the past mainly experienced the problem of unemployment, then the majority now exhibits a combination of a number of social problems over and above unemployment. Consequently it also becomes more difficult for the social workers to come up with convenient and easy "successes". At the same time, the individual social worker experiences the paradox projected by the present day activation policies. In addition to the level of unemployment falling, the activation policies now also address increasingly more diverse groups. All people of working age whom are not ill or early pensioners must be activated. However, individual social workers experience the fact that "heavy men" are very difficult to activate. This is firstly due to the fact that the well known and acknowledged methods of activation policies – and the actual practical utility of these – has little in common with these men's practical sense or the habitus that a person has internalised (Larsen 1999). Secondly, it is debatable whether activation is a useful and considerate method for addressing the type of social problems that this group of clients experience (Smed 1999), for example to use activation as a treatment of alcoholism.

Activation policy in Kongens Enghave

The contemporary type of activation that is present in the local activation projects does not primarily function, in any shape or form, as a springboard or step towards entry to the regular labour market. Most of those people that are activated in the local projects are a long way from being able to enter the regular labour market. Before people have progressed to the stage of being involved in a local activation project there has occurred a "creaming-off" process.[19] The unemployed who find it relatively easy to find work and/or are motivated towards education, very rarely end up in the local activation proj-

[18] Similar results are found in other Danish studies, for example in Sigaard and Fisker's (2001) study.

[19] This creaming-off process happens everywhere (Epsen et al. 1999; Hansen 1999). It is a well known fact that a differentiation and categorising is going on between those clients who are considered as resource strong, motivated and easy to integrate and those clients who are resource weak, lacks motivation and is difficult to integrate. The first group gets the best offers and gets them earlier, because they are more likely to produce intended goals of the measures employed. Mainly because of the decreasing unemployment it has been relatively easy to get the resource strong unemployed in normal wage work.

ects. Thus the local activation projects are mainly composed of people that are unemployed and have received benefits over many years. In many ways *the activation projects actually function as drop-in centres rather than labour market measures.*[20] When most of the people interviewed in Kongens Enghave express relatively high satisfaction with the activation projects (similar to results from surveys mentioned earlier on), then it is not because of the outlook to better prospects in the labour market or increased income. The main theme of stories about activation concern a sense of importance, meaningfulness and improved qualifications on both a work related and personal level. However, for many of the "heavy men" these positive effects of participating in activation projects do not continue when they repeatedly is ordered to do time in activation projects. In these cases activation appear as empty ritual acts.

Activation as a Reinstatement Ritual

Many of the current activation efforts, and particularly those that are rolled out under the banner of local "social activation", can be seen as ritual acts or rites of passage.[21] This ritual passage is a symbolic transition process that incorporates a separation from a marginal position in relation to a reinstatement back into normal community life – especially working life. A person needs to go through a type of initiation ritual to move from one type of existence to another. In primitive societies this process could for example, in moving from being a youth to becoming a man, include a physical separation from the rest of the community and a removal of all one's prior status and identity. This concerns a liminal or marginal phase, where a person exists in an uncertain situation between two phases. In this context, activation can be seen as a ritual that marginal people need to pass through to move onto a new type of life – and be able to preserve their right to means of existence provided by society. The clients at the Social Security Office are forced to participate in this rite of passage to be able to maintain their livelihood. As work and "activity" has taken on an almost sacred status in today's society then the ritual passage of activation acts as a cleansing and transition process with the purpose of having the activated person symbolically and practically demonstrating the will to change status from being a marginal person to becoming a potentially wage earner. Activation is thus both a transition and an integration ritual. The screening gate or the "Job House", as it is called in Kongens Enghave, that marginal people need to pass through - and the way in which they are differentiated, categorised and passed out to various types of activation and training activities - can be seen as the preliminal ritual whereby mar-

[20] Drop-in centres and places-to-be for mentally ill people, alcoholics, drug addicts and activated marginal people express different approaches to the politics of marginal place. Larsen (2002) describes drop-in centres for mentally ill people (and other marginal and lonely people) as pluralistic communities, drop-in centres for alcoholics as tribal communities and drop-in centres for marginal people in activation as forced communities. Accordingly, these communities produce different forms of identity, meaning and social integration.

[21] This interpretation of activation arrangements was inspired by Arnold van Genneps 'The Rites of Passage' (1960), wherein he describes and analyses ritual passages within various cultures.

ginal people are gradually moved away from the world in which they used to live in. The activation project and the activation space functions as a liminal space and time zone. The activated person is situated in liminal space and time between the marginal situation and the normal situation as self-sufficient. The activation place and the period of activation establish a symbolic and spatial place, which is indicative of a changeover phase.

It is important to emphasise the duality of the activation ritual, in that its purpose is not only to strengthen the sacred status of work, but also to function as a cleansing of the marginal person. So that the rituals, and the conduct of conduct that they are trying to elicit, can function according to the purpose, then it is critical that it is not just a symbolic game, that confirms the normal world of work's sacred status, but that the marginal person embodies and acts out according to the rules of the game. The ritual is meant to provide purpose and identity to the person who goes through this ritual passage. If agreement does not exist between the activated person and the system, which tries to implement this ritual ceremony, and if both parties are not familiar with and follow the ground rules of the game, then the activation will not have the desired behaviour-altering effect. In this case, the critical phase of activation is first, that the actual implementation of the process is meaningful to the activated person, and second, most importantly, that the post-liminal rituals actually result in integration into the real labour market – as is the prime objective of activation. Should this phase fail, then the person is returned to a marginal status and thus forced to pass through the same rituals at a later date. For those people who time and time again go through the activation rituals without moving across the line between post-liminality and integration, a sense of increased marginality results. A further reinforcement of someone's inability to move on in life has then forcefully been demonstrated. When the goal of the ritual act is to pass over the line that activation highlights, and when this goal is not reached for many participants in the activation projects, then the result is deep frustration on behalf of all those parties involved in the activation ceremonies. Most of the marginal men repeatedly involved in activation projects do not experience their time in activation as a passing over situation, in that most have low expectations and even fewer of them obtain regular work afterwards. Their experience – in contrast to most of the activated women who were interviewed – is not that they gain new qualifications and skills that they can use in the regular labour market, or for that matter in other areas of their life. Actually most of these men feel that the Social Security Office has refused to help them with courses and training which they themselves feel would help move them closer to the regular labour market. It is particularly middle-aged men with many years of practical experience on the labour market that feel as if they are treated as children by the managers of the activation projects they are engaged in – and the instructors on the projects also lack the skills to oversee, plan and give directions in the work that needs to be carried out. Thus, these men have little respect for the organisational set up of the activation projects, and they also see their involuntary referral to the projects as a lack of respect for them as people – and at best, as a waste of time. In their situation, activation appears as empty rituals and a display of power. Some of these men have developed a strategy to avoid

activation – or as they themselves put it: "to take a break from the system". At times they move to municipalities that are know for not being very proactive as far as activation projects are concerned.

Empowerment as social technology

As a response to some of the frustrations present at the activation projects in Kongens Enghave, an understanding has developed among the project managers and instructors, that is, that the activation projects must have an empowerment approach where the people to be activated are included in the decision making processes and thus gain more competencies and self-esteem.

Empowerment was originally defined as a remedy and a process whereby powerless and disadvantaged groups could attain power and self-determination. However, the empowerment concept has in recent times enjoyed a ripple effect – and in the various forms in which it today exists – it is being applied in the management of both public and private firms, as well as in social work with marginal people. Cruikshank (1999) has demonstrated how empowerment – understood as a instrument used to combat social exclusion and powerlessness – can be compared with other instruments and social technologies, in that the intention is to influence people's behaviour and thus improve their ability to deal with their situation so that they take more responsibility for their own and others' lives. As a social technology, empowerment is a way of acting in relation to others' actions. Empowerment is something that professional facilitators need to help marginal people deal with, such that they manage to gain control over themselves and their lives. Empowerment is no longer something that marginal and underprivileged people are fighting to attain, but something that others are trying to apply to marginal people (Baistow 1995). Empowerment is therefore not only a question of whether marginal people gain the power to change the existing order of things, but also to create order. This is a form of governmentality that works through and with, rather than against, marginal people's subjectivity's.

Project managers and instructors have expressed the opinion that there is a need for more active participation by activated people in the decision-making processes, for example, such as asking them to appoint a spokesperson. However, the activated people have stated their right not to be made "empowered", that is, they do not want to be part of representing a venture where their rights are being taken away from them. First, they feel that they cannot influence, or gain influence in determining the pay and working conditions that would be in place under activation projects. Second, they are forced to participate. Third, some people feel as if they are only casual workers, in that they after some time are forced to leave the activation project again. In effect, they are laid off from the project. Even for those who initially did not have a negative attitude towards activation, end up with limited enthusiasm for such projects and the conditions under which they are to operate. As one of the instructors on a project called "The Renovation

Team" pointed out, an empowerment approach to activation is paradoxical because in reality it impossible to create empowerment when people are not voluntarily attending activation project. Thus it is problematic to construct activation as an empowerment field, when a number of basic rights and possibilities for negotiation are out of reach. Activated people refuse to be "empowered" because they do not want to take on self-determination under liminal conditions where they loose their previous status and identity, and where society does not guarantee them a new status and identity after they have gone through the ritual passage. Many of the "heavy men" find themselves periodically alternating between the local activation projects and the drop-in centres for beer drinkers.[22]

To be or not to be active?

For most people, having a job is not only a necessity to provide the means of existence but it is also of prime importance for their self-perception, self-esteem and self-identity. Most unemployed people want to work – no doubt about that! In most cases, enabling activation policies may therefore be adequate means to help these people to get back on the labour market. However, it is very questionable if activation is a proper treatment of, for example, alcoholics and drug addicts. Seen from the perspective of labour market integration activation policy has not been successful in relation to such kinds of marginal people. Seen from the perspective of the marginal person activation policy may even reinforce their marginal position in that many activation projects for social assistance claimants produce a sense of personal failure and frustration. For physical and psychical vulnerable people there are numerous cases of activation causing an aggravation of their health conditions and of their quality of life. Furthermore, when social workers are forced to manage their clients in terms of making them "active" they may neglect or be unable to employ other and perhaps more relevant social technologies to achieve desirable behavior-alterng effects. In the contemporary politics towards certain groups of marginal people there seems to be too much emphasis on activation and too little on the caring part of citizenship. However, there probably always exists a delicate balance between efforts to activate and to care for marginal people. The pressing questions are: when are activation or caring measures appropriate and how can activation or care be applied in such a way that the clients personal lives and backgrounds and their own self-perceptions of problems and possible solutions are taking seriously into consideration by the welfare and workfare agencies. Social policy institutions are, however,

[22] There are many places in Kongens Enghave where "beer drinkers" meet. The best known places are the two drop-in centres, the "Carrot" and the "SV Drop-in Centre", established by voluntary social organisations but managed by the beer drinkers themselves. The story behind the two self-organized drop-in centres is about attempts to get the beer drinkers off the streets. It is about establishing separate places-to-be for a group of people that did not fit into any of the other spaces in the city district. But it is also about communities that are based on the idea of having a chat and a beer and of caring for each other (Larsen and Schultz 2001).

not dealing adequately with such challenges today - not least because the focus of policies and, accordingly, social workers are mainly on labour market integration.

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GEP - The Research Programme Gender, Empowerment and Politics

The Research Programme Gender, Empowerment and Politics (GEP) deals with the changing political importance of gender in modern societies. During the last 30 years, women have moved from a position of political powerlessness to political presence and influence in the Danish democracy. Women's new role in politics has had deepgoing consequences - not only for women but also for men.

The aim of the programme is to analyse the interplay between gender relations and discources of gender on the one hand and changes in the European welfare states and models of democracy on the other. The basic hypothesis is that politics is a determining factor for the construction of gender - and conversely that gender relations influence the political discourses and the political institutions. From this double assumption, new questions concerning the interconnection between civil, political, and social citizenship are analysed.

The programme emphasises two factors: First analysing processes and patterns behind the double tendencies toward empowerment and social exclusion of social groups in terms of gender and class. Secondly, the differentiation within the group of women and men analysing the interplay between gender and class. Maintaining the perspective of gender, these differentiations will make visible the differences of generations as well as the differences between the educated/employed and the marginalized groups.

Questions connected with public equality politics, the increasing representation of women, women's participation in the local political communities and the political elite, as well as strategies against marginalization and poverty will be discussed through projects and case studies.

The project is carried out by six scientists from four different institutions.

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